

# STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE



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# STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

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
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
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**MORI**



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*There is no phase in the intelligence business which is more important than the proper relationship between intelligence itself and the people who use its product. Oddly enough, this relationship, which one would expect to establish itself automatically, does not do this. It is established as a result of a great deal of persistent, conscious effort and is likely to disappear when the effort is relaxed.*

Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, 1949

## CIA INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MAKING

Center for the Study of Intelligence<sup>1</sup>

Sherman Kent and other early commentators of the connection between intelligence and policy<sup>2</sup> posited policy makers who consciously and carefully assembled information relevant to their problems, weighed policy options and implications, and proceeded to select courses of action. Intelligence provided part of the factual and interpretative background for this process and aided in the projection of the consequences of alternative strategies. The role intelligence producers were supposed to play was seen as sizable, yet carefully delineated; they were admonished to guard against too intimate an involvement in the policy-making process, lest they compromise their impartiality and objectivity.

With the benefit of additional years of perspective on the policy-making process, it now seems doubtful that such rational actor-based models ever adequately described it. They surely fail to do so today. Increasingly sophisticated analyses have revealed an intricate, often disorderly system of human and institutional interactions that is incompatible with traditional maxims about the role of intelligence. The Decision-Making models that emerged in the early 1960s<sup>3</sup> and more recent attempts to develop and apply sophisticated conceptual frameworks—notably the Organizational Process

<sup>1</sup>This paper was prepared by a study team comprising Ramsey Forbush (Office of National Estimates/Office of Political Research-retired), Gary Chasc (Office of Current Intelligence), and Ron Goldberg (Office of Strategic Research). It will be noted that the study concentrates almost entirely on policy making by the executive branch. The extent to which the Agency will be called upon in the future to provide increased intelligence support to the legislative branch depends in large part on the outcome of the recent investigative process, and on how strongly Congress persists in asserting prerogatives in foreign affairs. The study team believes that the implications of the intelligence-congressional relationship deserve separate study when the still-evolving nature of that relationship becomes more evident. The study also does not concentrate on the role of the DCI, inasmuch as this position transcends direction of the CIA and includes a great deal of intelligence community responsibility.

<sup>2</sup>See, for example, George Pettee, *The Future of American Secret Intelligence* (1946), and Washington Platt, *Strategic Intelligence Production* (1957).

<sup>3</sup>See Charles Lindbloom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'" in *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XIX, No. 2 (1959) and *The Policy-Making Process* (1968). See also, Synder, Bruck, and Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision Making* (1962).

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and Bureaucratic Politics models<sup>4</sup>—highlight the variety of forces at work in the policy-making process. They provide valuable insights into the dynamics of individual actuation, organizational functioning, and bureaucratic maneuver. Although the models deal with informational inputs and communications channels in policy making, they unfortunately tend not to single out intelligence for separate special treatment.

The same is true of the intriguing work psychologists and organization theorists have done on perception, information processing, and decision making by individuals, small groups, and bureaucracies.<sup>5</sup> There have been some attempts to apply the insights gained in these studies to foreign and national security policy making,<sup>6</sup> but without any systematic effort to assess the impact of intelligence as distinct from that of information in general.<sup>7</sup>

This study recognizes the utility of theoretical work in a variety of fields, but is not cast in terms of a particular model or framework. It attempts a fresh, pragmatic examination of the working elements in the intelligence-policy relationship, and a necessary starting point in this examination is an understanding of the policy-making milieu into which intelligence support funnels.

Traditional thinking about this milieu tends to focus on policy makers at the top—the Presidents and their closest advisors. Unquestionably these figures play a key role, especially in crisis situations, but there also is a great corpus of policy that is made or influenced by others—by the incremental day-to-day decisions of country desk and embassy officers, by the staff people who draft papers for their principals, and by the innovative suggestions of junior officers or aides.

Some policy decisions do rest on deliberations by a very few. Others, however, stem from recommendations of a high-level body reviewing the work of a middle-level committee that was derived from a series of options formulated at a lower level on the basis of inputs from the next level down. Policy can also result from nothing more than unchecked momentum. Thus, policy makers must be thought of as many and varied. Whether a policy determination occurs high, low, or in between, the set of people involved obviously will vary with the subject and geographical area, and the impact of intelligence will differ from case to case.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup>See, for example, Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (1971) and Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (1974). See also, Wilfrid Kohl, "The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System and U.S.-European Relations" in *World Politics*, October 1975.

<sup>5</sup>See Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (1957); Robert Abelson, *Theories of Cognitive Consistency* (1968); Katz and Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations* (1966); March and Simon, *Organizations* (1958); Holsti and George, "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy Makers" in *Political Science Annual*, Vol. 6 (1975).

<sup>6</sup>See Joseph DeRivera, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* (1968); and John Steinbrunner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (1974).

<sup>7</sup>Despite the lack of theoretical work specifically geared to the intelligence-policy connection, sophisticated and insightful studies that aid in understanding individual and organizational behavior should be of interest to intelligence producers. The Agency has tended to neglect these areas, and this probably has adversely affected efforts to make intelligence products more relevant and useful.

<sup>8</sup>There are, of course, those who would challenge application of the term "policy maker" to anyone except the President, his inner circle of advisors, and perhaps some key Under Secretaries. Others would attempt to distinguish between policy makers, advisors, and drafters. This paper arbitrarily uses the phrases "policy makers" and "policy people" very broadly, to encompass a wide range of individuals who are involved in the policy-making process regularly or on an *ad hoc* basis. References to "top" to "high-level" policy makers are to individuals at or above the Assistant Secretary level. The rest are those below that rank, i.e., mainly—but not exclusively—at the desk level.



Policy makers differ in interests, temperament, and working styles. These variations are not always apparent, however, and intelligence producers caught up in the effort to provide day-to-day support sometimes fail fully to appreciate resulting problems or opportunities.<sup>9</sup> There is also a less than complete understanding of areas of congruence and divergence in attitude and approach between policy makers and different kinds of intelligence producers. This is especially so regarding the operational orientation and activist inclination that policy makers share with operations officers.<sup>10</sup>

Policy people regard themselves as having certain expertise and ample sophistication. They are accustomed to interpreting, analyzing, and projecting, as well as planning, deciding, and operating. They tend, therefore, to be most receptive to intelligence that provides new information, makes the esoteric comprehensible, or answers a particular question on their minds. Intelligence that attempts to do for them what they believe they can accomplish competently themselves generally is less well-received.

Intelligence, of course, often is only one among a number of information sources available to policy makers, and they are under no obligation to be guided solely by its light. Policy may, in fact, be shaped by personal, bureaucratic, political, or other factors having little or no relation to intelligence input.<sup>11</sup> Intelligence producers nevertheless are obliged to do their best to insure that policy makers are aware of relevant intelligence and take it into account.

#### *The Varieties of Intelligence Support*

CIA intelligence feeds into the policy-making milieu in a wide variety of forms. The Agency's products and services could be categorized in a number of different ways. One such arbitrary format is developed below as an aid to the analysis in subsequent sections of the paper. The categories are not meant to be rigid, and there actually is considerable overlap.

*Current Intelligence*, provided orally and by a varied array of written products including finished intelligence publications, the output of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), and DDO disseminations, keeps a core of top policy officials and a corps of others apprised of a very wide range of developments. Current Intelligence includes reporting, interpretation, analysis, prediction, and even some customized service. Several different types of products and services are embodied in the category.

—*Broad Spectrum Reporting* from CIA is conveyed principally through the National Intelligence Daily and Bulletin and by the President's Daily Brief. White House Spot Reports, DDO Field Reports ("TDs"), and FBIS ticker help keep this coverage current, and some periodicals provide a reviewing service.

—*Focused Coverage*, by area or function, is handled partly by directing to certain policy makers only those materials pertaining to their responsibilities, and partly through publications specially designed for this purpose. Among the latter are the informal staff notes sent to selected policy people by Office of Current Intelligence

<sup>9</sup>Intelligence producers are unlikely to become aware of preferences and idiosyncrasies that affect policy makers' receptivity to intelligence unless they engage in "market research" through personal contacts with consumers. This subject is dealt with further in a subsequent section.

<sup>10</sup>The strong natural linkages between officers of the Deputy Directorate for Operations (DDO) and certain policy makers are discussed more fully below under "Oral Intelligence and Personal Relationships."

<sup>11</sup>An illustration of this kind of policy making appears in the section on "Use."

(OCI) divisions, the Office of Economic Research (OER) weekly on international petroleum developments, and periodicals from the Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology (DD/S&T) with current intelligence for policy people having scientific, technical, or strategic responsibilities.

—*Crisis Response Intelligence* is provided when a fast-breaking situation causes, among other things, a great surge of incoming traffic and acute need on the part of policy makers to know quickly what is happening and what may be about to take place. It is usually embodied in a series of up-to-date situation reports.

*Customized Service* is directly keyed to specific concerns of policy makers. It may be supplied in response to requests by policy people, special needs ferreted out by NIOs or others in contact with consumers, or concerns that intelligence officers determine independently. Examples include support for the delegations at the Strategic Arms Limitations (SALT) and Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, some National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), and other material produced by various Agency components, including the DDO.

*In-Depth Analysis* is the process of obtaining and evaluating all available pieces of evidence which seem reasonably to bear on an intelligence subject; seeking the counsel of other specialists; developing, testing, and refining hypotheses; and, finally, recording and issuing findings. The emphasis is on comprehensiveness rather than speed. Analysis of this kind for which the Agency has become respected is mostly in highly specialized fields—scientific/technical, military/strategic, or economic/financial. The Agency still is in the process of establishing a reputation for routinely high-caliber in-depth political analysis or for compelling analysis on the sort of broad questions that require interdisciplinary attack—whether political/military, political/economic, or all three.

*Predictive Intelligence* involves a willingness to think the unthinkable and an ability to forecast discontinuities as well as to identify trends. It includes much more than formally issued National Intelligence Estimates. Much predictive intelligence work is done in customized service and in certain kinds of in-depth analysis. Some also appears in Current Intelligence. The National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) have a special responsibility regarding the most critical kind of predictive intelligence, the Alert Memoranda. These are the formal warnings of the Director of Central Intelligence to top-level policy makers of possible developments abroad of major concern to the United States.

### *The Flow of Words and Paper*

The breadth and depth of the production described in the preceding section is impressive. Production of even the finest intelligence does not, however, guarantee that it will have an impact on the policy-making process. The intelligence message must be effectively communicated to policy makers, and this means that it must be received as well as sent.<sup>12</sup> There are clearly a variety of factors affecting delivery of the Agency's products and services. Many of them tend to blur the intelligence message,

<sup>12</sup>Communications theorists contend that no communication takes place until there is a transference of meaning in the mind of the receiver—see, for example, Thayer, *Communications and Communications Systems in Organization, Management, and Interpersonal Relations* (1968). This distinction is dealt with later in the sections on "Receptivity" and "Use."

and it does not appear that the extent of their impact is fully understood by intelligence producers.

### *Changing Structural Arrangement*

Formal institutional arrangements create some of the channels through which intelligence flows. Structural patterns tend to change with the varying concerns and attitudes of different sets of policy people, and the routes intelligence travels are shaped accordingly.

In the mid-1950s, when Robert Cutler was Special Assistant for National Security Affairs in the Eisenhower Administration, the National Security Council Planning Board had an established system for intelligence tasking and for the consideration of formal intelligence estimates as a regular part of the process of preparing policy recommendations for the NSC. The procedure was supposed to ensure that—as Cutler put it—“both Planning Board and National Security Council members should be *inseminated* (sic)”<sup>13</sup> with the intelligence. Unfortunately, that was not the result; though there was regular intercourse, the coordinated intelligence input usually seemed to be sterile, and the unschooled policy position often turned out to be impregnable.

The NSC machinery was substantially altered and then used less and in looser fashion during both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. For CIA intelligence, this meant both an expansion of the policy audience and an increased receptivity to insightful intelligence not coordinated within the intelligence community. In 1966, midway in President Johnson's term, a new substructure was adopted under the authority of the Secretary of State for “the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas.”<sup>14</sup> It provided for a Senior Interdepartmental Group—headed by the Under Secretary of State—and for a set of Interdepartmental Regional Groups subordinate to it. The President, at the same time, continued to take counsel from *ad hoc* groups and from advisors outside the government on a certain number of issues. Thus, the SIG/IRG never became the primary decision-making machinery under Johnson and Walt Rostow.

When President Nixon took office, he and Henry Kissinger replaced the system with the machinery still in nominal use today: the National Security Council Study Memoranda and Decision Memoranda. The NSSM approach has had the advantage for CIA intelligence of opening up new opportunities for productive working relationships between intelligence and policy people. Partly as a result of Henry Kissinger's being for a time both Secretary of State and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, however, structured use of the NSSM-NSDM apparatus declined considerably.<sup>15</sup> Even so, the NSSM-NSDM system has meant that the integration of intelligence and policy considerations frequently is undertaken at a relatively low level. This practice of mixing intelligence and policy early in the game is not unique to the NSSM-NSDM; it had become increasingly commonplace following the Eisenhower administration, and during the Nixon and Ford presidencies the tendency has simply intensified.

<sup>13</sup>Cutler, “Intelligence as Foundation for Policy,” *Studies in Intelligence* III/4, p. 65. (Winter 1959.)

<sup>14</sup>NSAM 341, quoted in Clark and Legere, *The President and the Management of National Security* (1969).

<sup>15</sup>Specialized entities such as the Verification Panel and its working group, in which CIA intelligence participation is particularly strong, have, however, been increasing in importance.

### *Getting Intelligence Through*

The way in which the structural overlay has evolved has resulted in an increasingly significant part of the intelligence message being conveyed to top-level policy makers in other than intelligence formats. Intelligence may be the implicit stimulus for an action proposal, inextricably interwoven in a set of options, or unrecognizably reincarnated in a policy paper. That a policy decision does not clearly reflect an identifiable intelligence input, therefore, does not conclusively demonstrate that intelligence played no role. The impact of intelligence often lies in a difficult-to-trace influence upon the people at lower levels who drafted, reviewed, revised, and forwarded options or recommendations. The importance of reaching *these* policy makers should not be underestimated. Intelligence producers must nevertheless aim for and reach the *top*-ranking policy people.

The path of written intelligence to policy-making principals almost always runs through at least one set of their "gatekeepers," the staff assistants who screen, select, and summarize. The widespread use of such human filtering mechanisms means that much written intelligence produced by the CIA today does not reach high-level consumers intact in its original context. In fact, the identity of a particular item as a CIA-produced piece of intelligence may be lost once it is excerpted, digested, and embedded amidst a collection of other equally anonymous bits of information. Even when a particular intelligence document actually does go through, the top-level policy maker will, like as not, read only a summary of its contents written and attached by an aide.<sup>16</sup> Many policy makers, moreover, tend to be unable to recall exactly where in the voluminous daily flow of information they have picked up particular items they find interesting or useful.

Personal delivery and oral exchange appear to be the surest—sometimes the only—ways of guaranteeing that intelligence—as intelligence—reaches those at or near the apex of the policy-making pyramid. The most notable recent instance of personal delivery paying off handsomely, of course, involved the President's Daily Brief (PDB) and Mr. Ford's copy of the National Intelligence Daily (NID). The President normally read them in the presence of the Agency officer who delivered them right to the Oval Office. This arrangement not only insured that these products got to and were read by the President, it afforded an opportunity for daily interchange between Mr. Ford and the Agency that proved valuable in providing intelligence producers with feedback on their efforts and insights into presidential concerns.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup>At the State Department, for example, high-level officials get their intelligence from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) which, in addition to producing its own analysis, selects, summarizes, and comments on material from other agencies. The fact that INR has coordinated an item for a national intelligence publication does not insure that it will endorse the item in its compilations and briefings. The National Security Council staff is another screening mechanism. Staff members will be the last readers of intelligence documents that they feel do not warrant higher-level attention. Products sent forward invariably are accompanied by a summary-extract-commentary which, unless coupled with a recommendation that the paper be read in full, is likely to be all that is read by key officials.

<sup>17</sup>Every President since Harry Truman has received the Agency's current intelligence, but in varying ways. President Nixon, for example, received a package of material from the White House Situation Room that contained intelligence produced by several agencies including CIA. President Eisenhower got oral intelligence briefings from his staff. President Ford initiated, but later discontinued, regular exchanges with an Agency officer. Whether a new mechanism for personal delivery of Agency products will be established is presently unclear. The NSC system gives the Director of Central Intelligence certain opportunities for direct access to the highest-level policy makers, especially during crisis situations. Beyond these structured settings, however, the DCI's ability for personal delivery of intelligence directly to the top may depend on his personal relationship with the President and other key policy officials. This element in the intelligence support process is critical in establishing the overall impact down the line of the Agency's product. It would appear that the support process can best function when the DCI has direct and routine access to the President.

*Oral Intelligence and Personal Relationships*

There are several traditional forums in which intelligence is conveyed orally. DCI briefings of the NSC, the Washington Area Special Action Group (WASAG), and the Senior Review Group (SRG) usually are the first order of business when these bodies meet, and regular substantive briefings of certain Congressional committees have become standard. The DDS&T has utilized the oral delivery form heavily since the late 1960s. More recently, OER has been employing oral briefings on a regular basis. Its presentations to top-level Treasury Department officials and other ranking economic policy makers—and its support to the briefers on their own staffs—have been highly successful.<sup>18</sup>

A number of policy makers, busy as they are, seem willing, oddly enough, to take time to be briefed even when the process winds up consuming more time than it would have taken to read a piece of written intelligence. Policy people seem to like the idea of having someone at hand to answer questions and take requests for further or different information. Assured delivery and attention, instant feed-back, and a chance to stay attuned to the policy makers' concerns are cited by those who have done extensive oral briefings as the key benefits to intelligence producers.<sup>19</sup>

There are, of course, potential pitfalls in providing intelligence orally. It takes a certain kind of personality to do the job successfully. The wrong approach can turn a policy maker off to intelligence in any form. There also are problems regarding monitoring what is said, correcting mistaken impressions, and avoiding an inattention to caveats—on either end of the exchange—that can result in tentative conclusions being given more weight than they deserve. These problems do not appear to be unsolvable; they would seem, in fact, to be outweighed by the positive benefits that flow from oral delivery.

Informal personal contacts and conversations between intelligence producers and policy makers also are responsible for the delivery of a good deal of intelligence. It is abundantly clear that operations officers are particularly adept at developing and maintaining such contacts. They are geared toward dealing with people by temperament and experience, and high-level DDO officers often are long-time acquaintances of ranking State Department officers. Friendships and mutual respect born of service together overseas carry over to relationships in Washington. The need for regular discussion of operational matters, and the fact that DDO officers normally represent the agency on many interdepartmental groups and committees, are important factors in sustaining these contacts.

There is, moreover, a quite understandable preference among many policy people for dealing with intelligence people they know and have had productive relationships with in the past. It also is evident that many policy makers have only a vague understanding of the organizational division within the Agency between intelligence collection and analysis. Even policy makers who are aware of Agency structure and who maintain regular contact with an NIO or a finished intelligence producer will

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<sup>18</sup>Much of the impetus for regular OER intelligence briefings of high-level economic officials came from former Treasury Secretary Schultz. When William Simon took over at Treasury he decided that the presentations were useful and should be continued. OER also polled officials outside of Treasury to see if they wanted their briefings to go on, and the answer was strongly affirmative.

<sup>19</sup>Economic policy makers have, as noted above, recently become very receptive to orally-delivered intelligence. The Pentagon, traditionally a heavy user of oral briefings itself, is another receptive audience. The Agency provided regular briefings on military and technical subjects to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. Oral presentations are often given to various senior Defense officials by CIA components.

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Intelligence Support

often turn to an operations officer for the answer to a substantive question.<sup>20</sup> This may be because the policy maker finds it more convenient to do so, or because he has particular respect for the opinion of an individual he knows has served in the area in question and dealt first hand with the people concerned. It may also be because the operations officer not only can tell the policy maker what is happening or may be about to occur, he can discuss these matters in an operational context that parallels the way in which the policy maker approaches the problem. The operations officer, in other words, can speak to the question of what the Agency can and cannot do to help influence the course of events. This is a dimension that is simply beyond the scope of those who produce finished intelligence.<sup>21</sup>

There have been instances in which finished intelligence producers have been very successful in developing productive interchanges with their customers. Force of personality and previous service on the policy side of things are two factors that seem to bear heavily on the success of such efforts.<sup>22</sup> Another factor is imagination and ingenuity in approaching policy makers with new ideas and specific suggestions about ways in which intelligence can help them, rather than empty-handedly asking in vague fashion, "What can I do for you?"<sup>23</sup>

Degrees of success in establishing good personal relationships with policy makers vary widely outside the Operations Directorate. Many finished intelligence producers lack the regular opportunity for contact with policy makers that operations officers have by virtue of their seats on policy-related, inter-agency committees, groups, or task forces and *ad hoc* discussions of "operational" matters. The pressure of day-to-day production for publications, moreover, tends to limit the amount of time finished intelligence producers—analysts and managers alike—can devote to developing and maintaining personal contacts with policy people.

The NIO system, established in 1973, was intended in part to alleviate this situation by creating high-ranking and highly visible bridges between policy makers and finished intelligence producers. The results have been mixed. The NIOs vary in

<sup>20</sup>One high-level State Department official, for example, indicated that the DDO Division Chief with whom he dealt on operational matters was also his major source of substantive information. He did know the name of the NIO responsible for the area, but noted that personal contact was infrequent. Another State Department official remarked that CIA analysis was first rate. The analysis he referred to turned out to be a situation report from a Chief of Station.

<sup>21</sup>Within the context of this aspect of the relationship between the operational officers of the Agency and their policy-making colleagues resides one of the traditionally more troubling internal problems for the Agency in terms of policy support. Is intelligence colored in ways which tend consciously or unconsciously to favor an operational activity or course of action upon which the Agency is embarked or involved? This issue has troubled a number of outside commentators on the Agency, most notably in connection with the Bay of Pigs endeavor. The question is particularly difficult and sensitive as a research topic and was not pursued at length in this paper, although it warrants a hard look in an internal Agency study.

<sup>22</sup>As an outstanding example of the force of personality at work is the case of OCI's Panama analyst several years ago. The analyst convinced policy people of the value of himself and his work to such an extent that he was considered to be practically a member of the policy team. Intelligence producers who serve temporary stints on the policy side often are able to develop insights and cultivate personal relationships that can be extremely useful when they return to their parent organizations. The experience of one such individual during recent Middle East negotiations is a case in point. Even if a rotational assignment turns out to be permanent, the former intelligence producer will carry with him an understanding of intelligence that is likely to have a positive effect on the intelligence-policy connection.

<sup>23</sup>A case in point was a scale model of the Sinai Peninsula, showing all terrain features, that was given to policy makers for use in the Middle East negotiations. CIA provided the model on its own initiative, and it became an invaluable tool during the discussions.

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their concept of their roles and in the duties they choose to emphasize.<sup>24</sup> Some finished intelligence producers seem to believe that the system has relieved them of any responsibility for consumer relations; others profess a desire to better their relationships with policy people, but feel inhibited by the existence of an NIO—some complain of being specifically discouraged from dealing directly with consumers.<sup>25</sup>

The lack of consensus among finished intelligence producers, and between them and the NIOs, on the allocation of responsibility for contacts with policy people appears to be causing some confusion and frustration. Clearer delineation of responsibilities would aid in efforts to improve policy makers' receptivity to intelligence through personal relationships.

The receptivity of policy makers to intelligence also hinges very heavily on the subject matter of the material offered, the policy makers' attitudes and preconceptions, and on certain other matters to which we now turn.

### *Receptivity*

Physical delivery of intelligence, written or oral, still does not insure that it will influence the policy-making process. Receptivity on the part of policy makers is required. They must appreciate intelligence as worthwhile and worthy of being taken into account.

Generally speaking, policy makers value and are receptive to the Agency's support, but they like some kinds of intelligence more than others. They tend to prefer hard—or hard-looking—facts to philosophical arguments, and they most appreciate receiving from intelligence that which they cannot—or cannot efficiently—provide for themselves. Especially coveted is the unique piece of information obtainable only from intelligence sources.

There is, thus, wide appreciation and brisk demand for material that some intelligence producers tend to regard as rather prosaic and routine—FBIS text, statistics, maps, charts, and biographies. It is clear that these products are more than raw inputs into the production of the finished texts of national intelligence; they are regularly received as independent products and used by policy makers who, right through the top levels, also take on sizeable quantities of so-called "raw" intelligence reports from the DDO.<sup>26</sup>

Attitudes toward finished intelligence products tend to vary with the subject matter. Receptivity is greatest in areas where it is recognized that manipulation of data and worthwhile analysis require special expertise or methodological know-how, as in

<sup>24</sup>Some NIOs appear to accord their responsibility for personal contact with policy makers first priority, and the bulk of their effort is in this area. Others, however, tend to concentrate more of their attention on the process of producing estimates and other—primarily interagency—intelligence products.

<sup>25</sup>Attitudes on this issue vary among the NIOs. Some do appear to believe that they are supposed to be the exclusive point of contact between finished intelligence producers and policy makers, at least with respect to high-ranking policy makers. Others, however, seem quite content with the existence of parallel channels of communication.

<sup>26</sup>The FBIS product in particular is widely distributed both electrically and in formal publications, and is viewed by many intelligence consumers as a key Agency product. FBIS field stations often provide the first indication of a coup or other important change within a country. Service personnel did a commendable job, for instance, in reporting on the invasion of Cyprus from positions in the middle of the battle. Occasionally, a foreign leadership will use the open radio to present new policies for the first time or will outline negotiating positions when speed is essential. The Mayaguez incident was a case in point.

The Agency's biographies of foreign leaders are also used extensively. When dignitaries visit the United States, policy makers turn to CIA for insights into their background or personality.

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the military, scientific, technical, and economic fields. Political intelligence that conveys a new piece of information or a fresh analytical approach is almost always welcomed, but there is less receptivity to the ordinary kinds of political interpretation and analysis, which policy people are prone to believe is surplus, if not inferior, to their own thought processes.

These distinctions are applicable to generalizations about policy makers' attitudes toward the various categories of CIA intelligence referred to earlier—especially so with regard to the variety of products and services that make up the Agency's current intelligence support. Feelings about the *broad spectrum reporting* of the NID and National Intelligence Bulletin run the gamut of personal tastes. Critics make mention of blandness of style, of inadequacies in coverage, and of lack of absolute currentness.

Other policy makers find these publications useful—though in different ways and for different reasons. Some like the convenience of a quick means to inform themselves about events other than those in their own areas of specialization. Others read only the coverage of developments pertinent to their specialties—and for the purpose of assuring that they have not missed any important information in their broader flow of traffic. The attention paid to the more analytical articles in broad spectrum reporting also varies widely among policy makers, depending upon the person's attitude, the subject matter involved, and the quality of presentation.

But some NID readers—including some of the most important readers—are not substantive experts on any particular area. The general educational service that the NID performs for these consumers appears to be of considerable importance. It seems clear that the Agency has to produce some kind of written daily intelligence product for a varied NID-level audience, and that no publication is likely to please all of these people all of the time.

It is at least arguable, however, whether the resources—especially analyst time—expended in producing the NID correspond to what it can reasonably be expected to accomplish. A good case can be made for the proposition that the NID's consumption of resources is out of proportion to this kind of publication's potential pay-off. Resource allocations necessarily involve trade-offs, and the Agency may be depriving activities that could have greater impact on the policy-making process.

*Focused coverage* finds a generally receptive audience. The economic, scientific, and technical publications are widely read and well-regarded. There is also much favorable opinion about OCI Staff Notes. Receptivity to these seems to be the greater because they have individualistic flavor—being the least edited and least coordinated of the many political intelligence products.

*Crisis response intelligence* is an Agency strong point. Policy people almost to a man prefer CIA Situation Reports to similar products produced by other agencies. Intelligence tends to be at a premium in crisis situations, but policy people want to know more than what is happening at the moment. They look to intelligence to anticipate and answer the next questions even as they are just beginning to arise.

Much of the Agency's most effective and influential work takes the form of *customized service*; providing answers to the questions posed by policy people, and focusing on the issues which especially concern them. Intelligence producers specializing in economic, scientific, and military matters, capitalizing on the strong interest in their material, have succeeded better in establishing the kind of intelligence-policy relationships needed for really productive interchange than have those

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concentrating on political subjects. Despite varying degrees of acceptance for specific categories of intelligence, however, there is a conviction widely held among policy makers that the Agency is a "can do" organization—that it is willing and able to respond quickly and helpfully on almost any kind of topic.

Many intelligence officers believe that customized service could be made even more relevant and useful if policy makers were persuaded to confide more about their plans and activities. To some extent and on some subjects this undoubtedly is so, and the quality as well as the responsiveness of the intelligence product suffers. In certain cases, policy makers realize that this is a price their confidentiality entails—and they are quite willing to pay it. They may, nonetheless, put a peculiar value on intelligence judgments which they know are made without the benefit of tightly held information available only to them. Their explanation for this seeming anomaly is that intelligence provides valuable checks on assumptions, and useful alternative points of view, even when intelligence producers are not privy to all that the policy maker knows. An argument can be made, moreover, for the proposition that a degree of standoffishness on the part of policy makers is sometimes beneficial in helping to diminish the danger that intelligence might become engulfed by policy making through enthusiastic provision of customized service that causes important longer-range issues to be overlooked or ignored in the effort to tend to customers' immediate concerns. On balance, however, the danger of irrelevance would seem to outweigh that of overinvolvement, and there is ample justification for persistent efforts to persuade policy makers to be more forthcoming.

Policy people profess a high degree of receptivity to *in-depth analysis*, and many say they would like to see more of it. They tend, however, to have difficulty describing with specificity the kind of thing they have in mind—although they are on occasion able to point to examples.<sup>27</sup> This "I'll know it when I see it" attitude is paralleled by annoyance with intelligence producers who expect policy people to suggest what intelligence can do for them in the way of in-depth analysis. There is a far more positive attitude toward the intelligence producer who has thought out in advance what ought to be relevant and who arrives with a first draft, an outline, or even a set of ideas.

Policy makers generally have little confidence in the Agency's ability to anticipate their concerns or in its *predictive intelligence*. This is particularly so with regard to formal National Intelligence Estimates, except for those that deal with military/strategic subjects. It is significant that NIEs are not usually accorded any

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<sup>27</sup> The following papers, produced over the last two years, have been specifically referred to by policy people as representing imaginative and helpful analytical work by the Agency.

- India: Developing Power or Developing Power Vacuum (OPR)
- China in 1980-1985 and in the Year 2000 (OPR)
- The Mood in Egypt (OCI)
- Potential Implications of Trends in World Population, Food Production and Climate (OPR)
- Military Implications of Technology Transfer to the Soviet Union (Interagency)
- What's Wrong With Political Europe (Office of the NIO)
- Authoritarianism and Militarism in Southern Europe (OPR)
- The Communist Party of Italy (OPR)
- Soviet Commentary on the Capabilities of U.S. General Purpose Forces (OSR)
- A Soviet Land-Mobile ICBM: Evidence of Development and Considerations Affecting a Decision on Deployment (Interagency)
- Prospects for Determining the Accuracy of Soviet Strategic Ballistic Missiles (Interagency)

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special treatment by "gatekeepers"; the NIEs undergo the same screening process as do seemingly less prestigious intelligence products. Many policy makers, in fact, seem to prefer an incisive solo treatment by a good analyst to a "watered down" estimate. Some, on the other hand, believe intelligence producers benefit from the rigors of the formal estimative process, and express appreciation for clear delineation of dissenting views.

The generally negative attitude toward predictive intelligence is founded on the belief among policy makers that the Agency's estimative record over the years has not been very good. Policy makers, however, share with intelligence producers the realization that predictive intelligence is a difficult line of business. They understand that some things are by their nature unpredictable and that others are virtually impossible to predict accurately. What policy people seem to want from predictive intelligence is an identification of forces at work, an indication of which trends are lasting and which merely transitory, an exposition of probable turning points, and an idea of what kinds of signals will portend particular types of changes. Policy makers especially want a helpful predictive performance on matters of great import to the United States. Failure to predict a coup that produces little real change in an area of marginal importance matters little to policy makers, if at all. Failure to provide advance warning of events such as a war in an area of major concern, however, is quite another matter.

Intelligence producers must be skilled in both short and long-range anticipation. Short-range anticipation is really an extension of independent determination by intelligence producers of the questions policy makers have, but fail to make explicit, and the questions that *should be* on their minds in a given situation, whether they are there yet or not. It involves anticipating the problems policy makers will need to have addressed as the situation develops. At present, this is at best a haphazard process in intelligence production, with results depending largely on the time and attention analysts and managers choose to give it. No one in the Agency has continuing responsibility for doing the special kind of thinking required. An entity formally charged with such responsibility might significantly enhance the relevance of finished intelligence products to policy makers' concerns.

Long-range anticipation involves foreseeing and warning policy makers of broad or specific problems they are likely to be confronted with in the future. It should be accompanied by a readiness on the part of intelligence producers to redeploy resources in preparation for future demands. It must be noted, however, that policy makers are by their own admission much less receptive to intelligence that attempts to warn of a problem far down the road than to material that helps them to cope with the day-to-day problems they face in the here and now.

#### *Use*

Even delivery to policy makers who recognize its quality and relevance to the problem at hand does not mean that intelligence necessarily will be the determining factor in a particular decision.

The impact of intelligence often depends on factors far removed from its intrinsic quality. Among these factors—which may operate singly or in combination—are: whether the intelligence message coincides with or runs counter to preconceptions on the policy side; how intelligence fits in or conflicts with other counsels and pressures; the ostensible "hardness" of the intelligence and the extent of unanimity of CIA elements—and of the intelligence community—in advancing it; the state of

interpersonal intelligence-policy relationships; and whether different policy makers are undecided, of the same mind, or divided in their approach to the problem.

Thus, intelligence quality, the adequacy of communications, and the degree of policy receptivity all bear upon the impact of intelligence. As the ensuing illustrative examples indicate, optimum achievement in all three categories is difficult.

*Problem Cases:* Policy makers are, from time to time, quite capable of deciding upon and becoming wedded to seemingly ill-conceived and uncompromising courses of action. Intelligence in such cases may ultimately help turn around—but seldom quickly or easily.

CIA's conservative evaluation of the effectiveness of the various U.S. bombing programs in North Vietnam was a consistent example of sound, careful analysis, clearly communicated. In contrast, the case originally made by military intelligence that the bombing effort was paying high dividends had an inherent weakness—the enemy resupply effort continued at a high level. Yet Secretary of Defense McNamara was not immediately persuadable that the CIA appraisal was the correct one, and President Johnson took years to convince. The policy makers' mind-sets and the mixed signals coming from the intelligence community both played a role.

During the period prior to and during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, CIA intelligence did much to explain the motivations that lay behind Indian policy and to describe the dire situation in East Pakistan. The analysis suggested that India was impelled to take action in East Pakistan because of the unstable refugee situation, and had at least some justification for assisting a Bengali population oppressed by the West Pakistan military occupation. The U.S., nevertheless, "tilted" its support to the Pakistani side. U.S. leaders apparently chose to take a "big picture" view of the situation, possibly seeing support to West Pakistan as enhancing a developing Chinese connection. A further consideration for U.S. policy makers was a profound irritation with the Government of India, which had shortly before signed a 20-year treaty of peace and friendship with the Soviet Union. Policy makers' attitudes were so firmly shaped by factors other than intelligence that they paid no great heed to it, except perhaps for such bits and pieces as served to reinforce their views.

Quite a different sort of problem can arise in those situations where a hot and seemingly hard piece of CIA intelligence conveys exactly—or almost exactly—what the policy makers are keen to believe. CIA's initial reporting on the 1965 crisis in the Dominican Republic seconded the worry that was already perturbing President Johnson and his aides, i.e., that the rebel movement in the D.R. was Communist-infested and that the U.S. thus faced the danger of a "new Cuba in the Hemisphere." Subsequent CIA and INR intelligence inputs provided a more accurate and balanced picture, but they never quite caught up with the initial impression that had been conveyed.

Policy makers can develop another sort of predilection, becoming overly sure that intelligence will be able to provide them appropriate support. This attitude may lead to unfortunate results if the expected intelligence is not forthcoming, or when it is impossible for the intelligence community to implement policy decisions. In 1970, the Israelis and Egyptians agreed to a limited cessation of hostilities along the Sinai front. The U.S. agreed to assist in monitoring the agreement, particularly in respect to the introduction of Egyptian air defense equipment into a denied area along the Suez Canal. The intelligence community, however, did not know the exact number of surface-to-air missiles in the prohibited zone. There was, therefore, a significant time

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lag before the U.S. could confidently state that the Egyptians were in violation of the agreement. As a result, Egypt was able to ignore Israeli protests and build up its forces in the denied area.

*Mixed-But Better Results:* Considering the variety of things that can go wrong on the intelligence side, the policy side, or in the relationship between them, it is worth noting that sometimes things go right. Unfortunately, it is far easier to document intelligence failures than to ascertain intelligence successes. Being accurate is adjudged normal and ordinarily is accepted without fanfare; errors or omissions, in contrast, are greeted with much dismay.

Intelligence judgments, moreover, may lead to action by policy makers that makes their accuracy impossible to determine. Early in 1975, for example, the intelligence community reported that the Turks might attempt to expand their hold on Cyprus. As a result of community concern, high-level policy makers sent messages to Ankara noting U.S. displeasure over any possibility of a renewal of warfare. It may have been that the Turks never intended to stage another military action and that the intelligence judgment was faulty; it is equally possible that the Turks were dissuaded from war by U.S. actions. Thus, in the very area where intelligence may have its greatest utility, there is a considerable problem in measuring its true impact.

Frequently intelligence is reasonably sound and persuades some policy makers readily, but further data and argument are required by others. In the latter part of May 1967, when tensions between Egypt and Israel had risen abruptly, high-level policy makers levied a series of questions on the CIA—the two most important being, “Will there be war?” and “Which side, if the U.S. stays out, will win?” The “yes” answer to the first was readily accepted, partly because Israeli officials were leaning on their U.S. counterparts to take the threat seriously. But the Agency prediction that Israel would win—quickly and decisively—was received with greater doubt. Secretary of State Rusk and Ambassador to the United Nations Stevenson posed the most vehement questions; DCI Helms came back with a reiteration of the judgment and an amplification of the basis for it. Even then Rusk was reluctant to accept the appraisal. His comment was “Dick, there is only one thing I want to say—as LaGuardia once remarked, if this is a mistake, it’s a beaut!”

Intelligence support that is quite difficult to appraise is the “mixed bag” where intelligence does well in some of its aspects, not so well in others. Those who conduct “post mortems” have to evaluate the positives and negatives and come out with an overall judgment. Often these conclusions turn out to be harsher in their appraisal of intelligence performance than are the statements of the top policy makers involved.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the intelligence community underestimated the imperatives that drove the Soviet Union to place missiles in Cuba. Intelligence did provide the first indication that the missiles had arrived and enabled the U.S. Government to verify missile deployments. Intelligence-derived materials were used to brief friendly countries on the new development. And during the ensuing naval embargo, reports from a high-level CIA source in the Soviet military apparently provided President Kennedy some additional assurances that the Soviet Union would not go to war over Cuba.

The more recent October War was another example of good and bad. Initially—and well ahead of time—the attention of high-level policy makers was focused on the Middle East by CIA intelligence reports that noted that possibility of military action. On the negative side, the analytical community reinforced policy

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makers' beliefs that war was not in the offing. Once military action began, however, CIA provided excellent crisis support including the critical judgment that the Soviet Union would not place regular ground forces in Syria.

CIA reporting on the Cyprus explosion also had its ups and downs. Analysts failed to predict the change in Greek leadership on Cyprus and never adequately described the motivations of the Greek "generals." CIA did provide advance warning of the Turkish invasion of the island and predicted the exact date. However, in attempting to ascertain the size of the Turkish invasion force, CIA analysts relied on the reporting from a defense attaché who greatly overestimated its strength. Dependence on this source occasioned a substantial error over how fast the battle would progress.

*Picture Book Examples:* Sometimes, albeit not too frequently, we find that virtually everything went right. Three instances in the Far East area reflect the variety and range of importance of these "picture book" situations.

Henry Kissinger and associates have been recurrently concerned over the past half-dozen years about the degree of tension between China and the Soviet Union and about the danger of major hostilities between them. In response to his urging, CIA has repeatedly assessed the issue, studying the military and strategic posture on both sides and probing into other aspects. The findings have been consistently sound and obviously helpful to the President and Kissinger during a delicate period when they have been nurturing new ties with China.

An instance of more measurable benefit had to do with a recent determination on military aid to South Korea. High-level policy people were concerned over the direction and levels of aid during the 1970s. They requested that the Department of Defense and CIA undertake a detailed examination of the North Korean "military threat"—i.e., of the forces of the North, their equipment holdings, their likely strategy. This intelligence study showed the need for a pronounced change in the mix of equipment provided to South Korea—more aircraft, fewer tanks, etc.—and also indicated the feasibility of a stretch-out in the planned delivery period. The study became the basis for developing a new and far more realistic long-term military assistance program to South Korea.

An area in which the Washington-based intelligence community is not regularly involved is that of tactical intelligence support to the field. The use of unique community resources, a correct appraisal of the situation, and a prompt warning to interested consumers provided a quick salutary result in November 1972. A CIA-chaired intelligence task force warned on the basis of cratology analysis that a squadron of Komar guided missile boats would be moving from Chan-chiang in South China south toward a North Vietnamese port. U.S. naval forces in the area were alerted, and the boats were intercepted and destroyed.<sup>28</sup>

Other kinds of highly-specialized intelligence service which CIA is capable of providing should not be omitted from this "picture book" discussion. As Henry Kissinger has proceeded with his long and painstaking diplomatic efforts to bring about a tentative Egyptian-Israeli peace accord, Agency specialists have assisted with crucial support in a wide range of areas. Special note should be taken of the CIA geographers whose detailed maps and intimate knowledge of terrain have been

<sup>28</sup>The Komars were the first of their type to be provided to North Vietnam by the Soviet Union. They were shipped by freighter to Chan-chiang and off-loaded prior to their high-speed run to North Vietnam. Had the Komars reached their destination, they would have been a serious threat to U.S. Naval vessels on patrol nearby.

particularly valuable, and of the technicians who were able to advise on feasibility and operation of an appropriate sensor system.

A final example which must be noted here—though with a reservation—is that of SALT support by the intelligence community and particularly by CIA. It is clear that the policy makers' confidence in intelligence verification, in the community appraisals of future missile force levels, and in the direct assistance provided to decision makers by CIA made the SALT agreements possible. It is equally clear that this is presently the most important of all the intelligence support accounts. Whether the 10-year intelligence projections that underlie the treaty-negotiations will hold cannot be foreseen. Thus, prudence dictates that intelligence support for SALT not be evaluated as an absolute success until more time has elapsed.

#### *Recommendations*

The research team believes that a number of measures aimed at making the reality of the intelligence-policy relationship more closely approximate the ideal are worthy of consideration.

*--An effort should be made to increase intelligence producers' specific understanding of the policy-making process.*

—Recent and ongoing theoretical work on decision making, organizational dynamics, and psychological factors should be selected, distilled, related to the intelligence-policy connection, and distributed to analysts and supervisors on a regular basis. A knowledgeable individual should be given full-time responsibility for the task.<sup>29</sup>

—Discussion of policy making and the role of intelligence, including realistic specifics on how various policy makers take intelligence aboard, should become standard practice within the Agency.

—The Office of Training should increase and sharpen the attention its courses and seminars give to policy making and the intelligence-policy relationship.

—Opportunities to place intelligence officers in rotational policy-related slots outside the Agency should be taken advantage of to the fullest possible extent. The experience gained by returnees from these assignments should be exploited by having them share their perspectives with other intelligence producers in appropriate forums.

*--Written intelligence products should be closely aligned to the realities of how information is received, screened, and processed on the policy side.*

—A very short executive summary containing the principal conclusions of the paper should precede all memoranda.

—Papers aimed for the top policy levels especially must seize attention quickly and get to the point rapidly.

—A paper should immediately tell the reader why he should be reading it, i.e., the problem or issue and its implications for the U.S.

<sup>29</sup> Intelligence producers are likely to find that this material will also provide highly illuminating insights into the process of intelligence analysis.

—Rationale for judgments, if too long or too involved to be included in the body of the paper, should be attached as an annex.

—Analytical differences should not be obscured in the name of intelligence community consensus. Policy people clearly prefer alternative interpretations to watered down consensus.

—Thoughtful, clearly labeled speculation regarding less likely eventualities or the implication of “irrational” actions by foreign leaders should be encouraged, especially in in-depth analysis.

—*A new intelligence product should be considered.*

—There would be considerable receptivity to ultra-current “Morning Briefing Notes” on the part of the aides of high-level policy people. The purpose of such a publication would be to make the recipients’ morning briefings and compilations sounder, fuller, more consistent in their use of intelligence information, and more reflective of the Agency’s view of what should be brought to the attention of principal policy makers. The idea is similar to that of the once popular, internally distributed *Night Journal*. Distribution of the “Notes” could be made so as to reach the desks of aides as morning briefings were being prepared.

—The “Notes” would be informal, non-coordinated summaries and comments on significant overnight traffic—e.g., important State of Defense cables, DDO reports, intercepts, and press—not accounted for in the NID. The NID is more current than the old Central Intelligence Bulletin, but only the most critical new items are usually added in the wee hours, and they are often only factual treatments. A widely voiced criticism of the NID is its failure to be consistently relevant to the ultra-current morning concerns of many policy makers.

—The new product could be prepared by night NID representatives and electrically disseminated at the last possible moment.

—*There is a need for serious study of what a realistic estimative mission ought to be for the CIA and of what resources the Agency ought to devote to it. Policy makers seem to be less interested in estimative judgments per se than in the basis for them; i.e., the laying out of the forces at work, the possible turning points, and the leverage—if any—that the U.S. has in determining the outcome.*

—A study of the estimative mission would aim basically at generating some suggested guidelines on the scope, format, and most useful organizational approaches for the production of estimates.

—It would need to be based principally on in-depth research with consumers and producers, and the use of case studies.

—*Greater emphasis should be placed on reaching mid-level policy makers.*

—Fuller advantage should be taken of publications aimed specifically at this audience; they should cease to be the stepchildren of top-of-the-line products. To the extent possible, content of such publications as the National Intelligence Bulletin<sup>30</sup> should be especially tailored for the mid-level consumer.

<sup>30</sup> Since this writing, the NIB was terminated in May 1976 and has been replaced by the electrically-disseminated NID Cable.

Analysts whose accounts are relatively inactive, for example, should prepare longer, more analytical items for the NIB.

—Some predetermination should be made, where possible, of the intended audience for memoranda and other intelligence papers so that they can be tailored accordingly. If the audience is primarily mid-level, the paper might contain more detailed background, explanation, and argument than one designed especially for senior officials.

—Although admittedly difficult on a consistent basis, intelligence products should, to the extent feasible, be addressed to intended recipients by name.

—*There should be increased organizational awareness and coordination of disparate policy support activities.*

—Consideration should be given to the establishment of a centralized Agency mechanism—perhaps computer-based—for improving intra-agency awareness of ongoing policy support projects, maximizing opportunities for contributory inputs, and helping to make policy makers more aware of the full range of potentially relevant intelligence products and services.

—A comprehensive study of the problems and prospects of oral dissemination should focus on the impact of oral delivery on efforts to improve the coordination of intelligence support.

—*The Agency should try to increase policy-maker receptivity to its political interpretation and analysis.*

—The aim should be to convince policy makers that there is something about the Agency's work in this area that separates the CIA's finished political products from the kind of thing policy people believe they can do just as well or better themselves.

—Efforts along this line should include further attempts to impart a measure of uniqueness to finished political intelligence through sophisticated interweaving of political, economic, military and psychological analysis. In this regard, further study is needed of the efficacy of various methods—e.g., team approaches, cross-disciplinary training, structural reorganizations—of fostering truly integrated interdisciplinary analysis.<sup>31</sup>

—It should be clearly understood that the NIOs' important responsibility for developing personal relationships with consumers is not meant to preclude other contacts between intelligence producer and policy maker at appropriate levels, and political analysts should be given the opportunity, encouragement, and incentive to take especially vigorous initiatives to develop and sustain these relationships. Individual analysts should be responsible for monitoring

<sup>31</sup> Greater interdisciplinary synthesis would have a number of beneficial effects. OER's success in building a receptive audience for its products has been significant, but this constituency consists primarily of a particular group of economically-oriented policy people. There remains a need for economic analysis to be truly integrated with insights from other disciplines and presented in a manner intelligible to the high-level policy maker unfamiliar with purely economic terms and concepts. Policy people value even speculative material that tells them something about what makes an individual tick, and the Agency's psychological profiles are well regarded. Greater use of psychological insights might further enhance appreciation for this aspect of the Agency's work as well as increase receptivity to political analysis.



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policy personnel changes and for making and keeping themselves known as specialists with something to contribute. They should be aware of and utilize the kinds of approaches that evoke positive responses on the policy side, and avoid the unproductive "What can I do for you" syndrome.

*—The Agency should continue to impress upon policy people the fact that the relevance and utility of intelligence are directly related to their willingness to share their concerns and other information with intelligence producers.*

—Intelligence officers in contact with policy makers at all levels should persist in efforts to make this point.

—Significant informational gaps that intelligence producers believe policy people might be able to fill if they were so inclined should be explicitly noted—both in formal publications and informal conversations—so as to encourage communication and avoid misunderstandings concerning the basis for intelligence judgments.

*—Insufficient feedback and a degree of secretiveness concerning policy plans and developments will persist, however, and the Agency should also strive to improve its ability to determine independently the questions policy makers need answered.*

—The DDO and the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence (DDI) must work together in this endeavor, and the DDO's unique operational links to policy officials should play a key role. Regular meetings between DDO Division Chiefs, NIOs, and representatives from DDI production offices should include detailed discussion of policy makers' current and incipient concerns. Working arrangements between DDO Division Chiefs and the NIOs currently are positive and helpful, but they generally fail to achieve the mutually reinforcing relationship needed between the DDO and the producers of finished intelligence because there is no mechanism for insuring that insights into concerns on the policy side gained by the DDO are fully shared with the DDI.

*—Concern for improving the immediate relevance of intelligence should not be allowed to obscure the equally important need for the Agency to improve its ability to anticipate the problems that policy makers will be confronted with in the future.*

—Consideration should be given to the establishment of broadly-based mechanisms within the Agency charged with routine review of substantive areas with the mission of providing continuity, consistency, and direction for thinking ahead, challenging accepted hypotheses, and sensing changes in underlying trends. The NIO system and the KIQs (Key Intelligence Questions) are steps in this direction, but much remains to be accomplished.

—A great anticipatory burden will, however, always rest on individual intelligence producers. They must avoid becoming so immersed in the problems of the moment that they fail to foresee those of the future.

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*Examining President Truman's role  
in the establishment of the Agency*

## TRUMAN ON CIA

Thomas F. Troy

President Harry S. Truman had his own version of his role in the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency. He once summed it up this way: "I got a couple of admirals together and they formed" the CIA.<sup>1</sup> Another time he was quoted as describing the CIA as "his invention."<sup>2</sup> Again, while still President, he told a CIA audience: "I . . . suggested [to Admiral William D. Leahy] that there should be a Central Intelligence Agency," and consequently "The Admiral and I proceeded to try to work out a program."<sup>3</sup>

In Truman's most extended account, in his *Memoirs*, he related how he discovered the lack of coordinated intelligence in Washington, asked what was being done about it, solicited advice, issued what he referred to as an "Executive Order," and—presto!—then began to receive a "daily digest" of information first from his Central Intelligence Group (CIG) and then, when CIG was "renamed" in the National Security Act of 1947, from his CIA.<sup>4</sup> That was his view of the event—"one of his proudest accomplishments," according to daughter Margaret.<sup>5</sup>

Unfortunately, Truman's version is the only one left to the public by anyone involved in the event. Until recently, there was little scholarly interest in the subject, and in any case there was little unclassified primary source material on which scholars could work. They could only make passing remarks about Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt, "Wild Bill" Donovan, and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), sink their teeth into a few unexciting public documents such as the 1947 Act itself and then happily pick up Truman's first-hand account. Of late, moreover, scholars and writers alike have been so hard pressed to keep up with daily publicity about CIA's alleged deeds and misdeeds that again they can only fall back on Harry Truman for a few necessary introductory remarks about CIA's origins. His view, in short, has become gospel, and not surprisingly he himself is generally credited with providing "the real impetus"<sup>6</sup> to the creation of CIA.

Unfortunately again, Truman's version is not quite accurate or adequate. The result is that it does little justice to the decade of intelligence history that preceded

<sup>1</sup> Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman*, (Berkeley, New York, 1973) p. 420. Presumably Truman was referring to Adm. William D. Leahy, then Chief of Staff to Truman in Truman's capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy, and Adm. Sidney W. Souers, Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence and then the first Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Alan Aurthur, "The Wit and Sass of Harry S. Truman," *Esquire*, August 1971, p. 115. He is further quoted as "being sorry he'd started the whole thing."

<sup>3</sup> "Remarks at a Meeting of an Orientation Course Conducted by the CIA," Nov. 21, 1952, *Public Papers of the Presidents. Harry S. Truman, 1952-53*. (GPO, Wash., D.C. 1966), p. 1061.

<sup>4</sup> Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs, Vol. 2: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953* (Doubleday, New York, 1956) pp. 55-58. (Actually Truman did not issue an Executive Order, but a presidential directive in the form of a letter addressed to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.)

<sup>5</sup> Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman* (Morrow, New York, 1973) p. 332.

<sup>6</sup> David Binder, "Idea for Creating a C.I.A. Grew Out of Pearl Harbor," *New York Times*, Dec. 26, 1974, p. 1.

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Truman, to the creative genius of Donovan, and to the administrative trailblazing of Roosevelt. Also, Truman's account—especially as related in a 1963 syndicated article to which we shall come later—has left an erroneous account of the original character and functions of the Agency.

Hence an examination of the records now available will not only set the record straight and do justice to Donovan and Roosevelt, but also provide helpful illumination on the origins of certain elements of the CIA character in which there is considerable current interest.

### *A "Calamitous" Prospect*

Today the United States has an "intelligence community" of which the members are CIA, State, Defense, the FBI, Treasury, and the former Atomic Energy Commission, now the Energy Research and Development Administration. To this community, the Director of Central Intelligence is central. For the greater part of the nation's history, however, there has been no community, no center, and not even the parts with which to make a community. For the first hundred years, organized intelligence, both overt and clandestine, was at best a tolerable wartime necessity, a peacetime "no-no," a thing without permanent status or organization in the American governmental system.

The situation changed significantly in the 1880s, a decade which coincidentally saw the birth of three men central to this story—Donovan, Roosevelt, and Truman. First the Navy and then the War Department, responding to technological and organizational changes, copied European nations by establishing on a regular, peacetime basis the country's first naval and military intelligence services—the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in 1882 and in 1885 the Military Intelligence Division (G-2), as they were known in the World War II period. Their work was essentially the overt collection of information on the armies and navies of the world and the discovery of enemy activity in the U.S. In wartime they carried on espionage and counterespionage.

These two departmental newcomers—small, underfinanced, and lightly regarded in the Navy and War departments—co-existed over the next half century with equally small and half-hearted foreign intelligence collection and production efforts in State and Treasury, and later in Commerce, Agriculture, Interior, and Justice (FBI). Their co-existence, however, was that of strangers on a highway. They pursued their respective departmental tasks in isolation and often in distrust of one another. What was needed, said an ex-naval attaché in 1929, was something he mistakenly thought the British already had, namely a "Wheel of Intelligence" with a "Central hub," which would coordinate all the intelligence received and funnel it to top policy-makers. He thought they needed a coordinator.<sup>7</sup>

Ten years later Roosevelt, worried about German and Japanese spying in the United States, and unhappy with his investigative services, ordered the FBI, G-2, and ONI to coordinate themselves. He directed them in 1939 "to function as a committee to coordinate" the investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters affecting the country.<sup>8</sup> From this directive came the Interdepartmental

<sup>7</sup>[John A. Gade,] untitled memo [n.d.,] Records of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Record Group 38 (U.S. National Archives, Wash., D.C.), job 3679, box 66, exhibit 20751.

<sup>8</sup>Memo, Roosevelt to Secretary of State *et al*, June 26, 1939, quoted in J. Edgar Hoover, "Role of the FBI in the Federal Employee Security Program," *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 49, no. 3 (July-Aug., 1954) p. 333.

Intelligence Conference (IIC) where the heads of those agencies met weekly to share what bits of information each cared to divulge.

Connected with this development were two early American ventures in 1940 into the foreign clandestine intelligence field. One was the Navy's "Special Intelligence Section" (SIS) whose founder, ONI chief Admiral Walter S. Anderson, today recalls that "it never got off the ground, because it was taken over by Bill Donovan."<sup>9</sup> The second was another SIS, the "Special Intelligence Service" which was run by the FBI in Latin America; J. Edgar Hoover had to give it up six years later when Truman established the CIG.

These three organizations—the IIC and the SIS pair—were primarily concerned with counterintelligence, and they were operated on a mixed basis of independence and self-coordination. None of the parent organizations was prepared to accept an outside coordinator.

Hence ONI and G-2 were shaken up in March, 1941, by a story circulating about the then Colonel Donovan. "In great confidence" ONI reported to G-2 that Donovan was fostering "a movement . . . to establish a super agency controlling *all* intelligence." The G-2 chief, Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, relaying the news upward to Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, described such a development as "very disadvantageous, if not calamitous."<sup>10</sup> There was enough truth in the story to justify their alarm.

#### *A Beginning*

First, William J. Donovan had been for years a public figure of great standing: the almost legendary "Wild Bill" of World War I fame, a Congressional Medal of Honor winner, founder of a large, prestigious Wall Street law firm, and an articulate stalwart of the Republican Party. More to the point, as a private citizen he had from 1935 to 1939 seen more of foreign chancelleries, battlefields, and military installations than many whose business such things were. Furthermore, he had taken two unprecedented trips as FDR's emissary—first to London in the grim days of mid-1940, and then later in the year for three months to Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East—and had emerged in the press not only as a seasoned observer of the international scene but also as Roosevelt's "mystery man" in foreign affairs.

Secondly, this influential "mystery man" had developed a special interest in strategic intelligence and special operations. He had studied not only Nazi military strategy and tactics but also Nazi radio propaganda, economic warfare, political subversion, and psychological warfare. Likewise, he had been thoroughly briefed on British experience in intelligence, propaganda, subversion, and commando operations—thanks largely to the efforts of Britain's wartime intelligence chief in the U.S., now Sir William S. Stephenson, lately celebrated in *A Man Called Intrepid*.<sup>11</sup> By early 1941 Donovan was convinced by the course of the war that the U.S. had to get into all those fields; and he, collaborating with Stephenson, had indeed developed a plan for a new agency to do just that.

<sup>9</sup> Interview with the author, Feb. 12, 1968.

<sup>10</sup> Memo, Miles to Marshall, "Coordinator for the three Intelligence Agencies of the Government," April 8, 1941, Records of the Army Staff, Record Group 319 (Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md.), file 310.11

<sup>11</sup> William Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1976). See also H. Montgomery Hyde, *Room 2603* (Farrar, Straus, New York, 1963).

To the dismay of G-2, ONI, and the FBI, who were not even consulted by Roosevelt, Donovan's plan was implemented on July 11, 1941, when FDR named Donovan "Coordinator of Information" (COI). As such he was the nation's first chief of foreign intelligence and special operations. COI is little known today, because it was transformed a year later into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which subsequently garnered all the publicity. Even so, it deserves close attention, because it embodied fundamental principles of theory and organization which are basic to the CIA as it was set up by Congress in 1947.

One, Donovan, breaking with the traditional narrow conception of intelligence as "military" or "naval," broadened it to include the political, economic, social, scientific, topographical, and biographical—anything that constituted a nation's strength or weakness in international affairs. Two, Donovan conceived such intelligence as serving primarily the President as foreign policy chief and Commander-in-Chief. Three, this orientation to the President produced the distinction between strategic or national intelligence—what the President needed—and "departmental" intelligence—what the various departments, such as Army and Navy, needed—to accomplish their particular missions. Four, this last distinction required the establishment of an independent agency alongside of and yet central to the other intelligence services. Five, in Donovan's concept the new agency had a variety of tasks, including such diverse enterprises as espionage, research and analysis, subversive operations, and commando operations. Finally, the new agency encompassed both overt and covert activities. For intelligence, in sum, Donovan in 1941 sought high status, independence, centrality, and diversity of functions.

Donovan also laid down some restrictions, which are especially relevant to current interest in CIA's charter. In the first paper he ever wrote on intelligence, before he became COI, he stated that an intelligence agency must not be controlled by "party exigencies," inasmuch as its only *raison d'être* was national defense. Also, he emphasized that the agency had nothing to do with domestic affairs, that its work was "foreign investigation[s]" and "intelligence work abroad." Finally, with due regard for the right of other agencies to do their jobs, he declared that a foreign intelligence agency should not take over "the home duties" of the FBI or the work abroad of G-2 and ONI.<sup>12</sup>

To Donovan, then, who needed no schooling in American political theory, constitutional law, and sound democratic procedures, it was axiomatic that a foreign intelligence agency, such as he conceived it, had no monopoly on intelligence, no domestic political role, and no domestic police or law-enforcement function. Furthermore, he held to those positions in all the planning and debating that led to the National Security Act. Indeed he, and no one else, was the first to make those points clear.

No sooner had the news of Donovan's imminent appointment been bruited about than all the regular departments got "their hackles up over the danger that somebody is going to take something away from them."<sup>13</sup> Their opposition turned out to be as steady as had been anticipated. They feared empire-building by Donovan—"a physical activator," according to FDR's advisor Judge Sam Rosenman, and "a real buccaneer" in the eyes of Amb. David K. Bruce, who served in OSS.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Letter, Donovan to Frank Knox, April 26, 1941, Donovan Papers, (CIA Historical Intelligence Collection), job 66-595, folder 22.

<sup>13</sup> Letter, Knox to Roosevelt, June 25, 1941, Roosevelt Papers (Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.), OF 4485, box 1.

<sup>14</sup> Author's interviews with Rosenman, Nov. 11, 1971, and with Bruce, Dec. 11, 1969.

Donovan never did really become "Coordinator of Information," simply because the military services never gave him the information to coordinate. In the early days he had to rely for information and other assistance on Stephenson and British intelligence. Indeed, in the internecine warfare that engulfed Washington, COI was almost destroyed twice. Though shorn of its foreign propaganda function, COI was saved by Roosevelt in 1942 when it was reorganized as OSS—when Donovan, still reporting directly to the President, was subordinated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). It was saved again in February, 1943, by JCS intervention at the White House. Indeed it was not until late 1943 that OSS was assured continued wartime existence.

### *Skullduggery and Death*

By then intelligence had become an "in" thing. There were more than forty agencies collecting, producing, or disseminating intelligence; personnel rosters, budgets, and activities had skyrocketed. Despite serious problems and conflicts, people—scholars and spies alike—liked the variegated business. They all agreed the prewar intelligence setup was faulty, the wartime situation was chaotic, and the postwar situation had to be better than either. With ultimate victory assured by 1943-1944, intelligence practitioners turned their thoughts to the postwar organization of intelligence.

It was a case of the world against OSS, of the oldline agencies against a pretentious Johnny-come-lately. G-2 and ONI were resolved that OSS, a warborn agency, would die with the end of the war, and that they would grow in strength and prestige as they had not been able to do after World War I. The FBI, having tasted foreign operations in South America, and having established a few non-American posts, looked forward to displacing OSS and expanding its SIS on a world-wide basis in collaboration with traditional colleagues—G-2, ONI, and State. In State some forward-looking elements, more interested in research than espionage, tried to persuade their upper echelons to organize a State Department intelligence unit so that State could not only do its own job but also take the lead—befitting its foreign affairs primacy—in organizing the intelligence activities of the remainder of the government.

Except for OSS, no intelligence service and no department really had a viable idea of what the postwar intelligence setup ought to be. None had progressed beyond the idea of the IIC and the various joint intelligence agencies and activities that had grown up like Topsy within the military services. None certainly had any wish to be made a spoke in any "Wheel of Intelligence," and none desired any wheel made by any outsider, least of all by Bill Donovan.

OSS, for its part, though fully conscious of its tenuous hold on life, was nonetheless convinced it held within itself the only adequate idea for a permanent system. Donovan's original COI proposal was geared to permanency as well as to war. In 1943 Donovan told a military audience he hoped the country would have sense enough to continue something like OSS into peacetime. Later that year he gave the JCS his outline for permanent establishment of OSS as "a fourth arm" of the military services. In 1944 OSS, as a going concern—with a leader, personnel, programs, facilities, experiences, energy, and ambition—felt it was a natural nucleus for a permanent agency.

Seizing an opening provided by Roosevelt, Donovan brought the matter to a head on November 18, 1944, by submitting a formal proposal for the establishment of a postwar central intelligence service. Its essential features were: an independent agency responsible to the President and advised by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy;

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several functions, including the coordination and production of intelligence, the conduct of espionage and counterespionage, "subversive operations abroad," and "such other functions and duties relating to intelligence" as the President might assign it; and certain restrictions, including the denial of any "police or law-enforcement functions, either at home or abroad."<sup>15</sup> The plan, with Donovan's energy and influence behind it, was a major challenge to the other intelligence services.

They had their first opportunity to attack it when Roosevelt asked for the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—Donovan's bosses—who sent the paper down the JCS ladder to the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) for the initial preparation of a reply to the President. Calling the plan "unsound and dangerous," the military members of the JIS (Army, Navy, and Air Forces) said it interfered with the chain of command, deprived commanders of control of their intelligence, and—by vesting operating functions in a coordinating agency—threatened the existence of all other intelligence services.<sup>16</sup> They feared Donovan aimed to take over G-2 and ONI. As their recommendations, they vested responsibility for coordinating all federal foreign intelligence activities in the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, and left it to them or the JCS to establish or run three separate, interdepartmental services for coordination, production, and operations. In other words, they did not stray far from the traditional approach of self-coordination.

The JIS civilian members—State, OSS, and the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA)—agreed with their colleagues in subordinating intelligence not to the President but to the three secretaries plus a JCS representative in time of war. The civilians additionally considered "subversive operations" not the "appropriate function" of an intelligence agency.<sup>17</sup> (They failed to say to whom it was proper.) Otherwise the civilians, whose FEA member Max Ways had already done much work on the subject, were very sympathetic to the Donovan plan. They wanted a central agency, an independent budget, the functions—including espionage—the powers, and restrictions much as laid out by Donovan. Hence they took over the form, the substance, and very much of the language of the Donovan plan, made their modifications, and submitted that as their response, but the military considered it almost as bad as Donovan's plan. That made three plans under consideration. The JIS, united only in opposing the Donovan plan, could not resolve their own differences and sent the disagreement up the ladder to their parent body, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).

The JIC, consisting of the heads of the intelligence services and top representatives of State and FEA, one December day vigorously debated the issue for three hours. The major issue was control. The military members thought the plans of both Donovan and the civilians established an intelligence dictator; the civilians argued that their plan gave the CIA only enough stature and power to enable it to survive likely opposition from powerful departments. The military thought the civilians' plan, like Donovan's unsound and dangerous; the civilians claimed the military plan put something into effect but nothing happened. Unable to reach agreement, the JIC returned the problem to JIS and told them to try again.

While compromise seemed impossible, both the JIS and the JIC knew they had to produce a decent reply for the JCS to send to the President. That reply, they knew, had

<sup>15</sup> Memo, Donovan to Roosevelt, Nov. 18, 1944, and enclosure, "Substantive Authority Necessary in Establishment of a Central Intelligence Service," Donovan Papers, "OSS Reports to the White House, Nov.-Dec. 1944."

<sup>16</sup> JIS Serial 96, "Proposed Establishment of a Central Intelligence Service," Dec. 9, 1944 (SECRET) OSS Records, (CIA, Wash., D.C.), Wash-Dir Ad 67 (JIS Series 96.)

<sup>17</sup> JIS 96/1, *ibid.*

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either to accept the Donovan plan or offer an acceptable alternative. The civilians had offered one; but since the military had not done so, it was they who felt the pressure to yield. Exacting their price, they finally, on January 1, 1945, accepted the hitherto heretical idea of a new agency, with an independent budget, and with a concentration of functions. These last included the coordination and production of intelligence, the performance of "services of common concern"—which everyone knew included foreign espionage—and the performance of "such other functions and duties related to intelligence" as might be authorized. They accepted all this only because they insisted on subjecting the agency to the rigid control of a "National Intelligence Authority" (NIA) whose membership—the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and a representative of the JCS—guaranteed the military considerable influence, to say the least.

The proposed agency—largely Donovan's agency but under military control—was not Donovan's idea of an independent agency serving the President and advised by the various secretaries, but it was considerably more than the military services had ever previously contemplated. In fact, thanks to unrelenting pressure from Donovan and probably to the surprise of the military themselves, the latter actually now had in this JIC compromise their own plan for a postwar, multi-purpose intelligence agency. Even so, it was by no means out of the woods.

This JIC plan and the original Donovan plan next climbed to a third rung of the JCS ladder—that of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), a body of senior advisors. They also condemned the Donovan plan. Endorsing the JIC compromise but reflecting continuing deep opposition within the military, the JSSC considerably slowed down the process of implementation. They recommended immediate establishment of the NIA, a Director of Central Intelligence, and an intelligence advisory board and left to all of them the task of drawing up the plans for the agency itself. They also recommended, in response to Navy pressure—and with no opposition from anyone—that the new agency be obligated to protect "intelligence sources and methods."

Meanwhile, skullduggery of the first order was in the works. Before the matter could be taken up by the Joint Chiefs themselves, and while Donovan was preparing to carry the fight for his own plan to the JCS and, if necessary, to the President, someone—Donovan immediately suspected J. Edgar Hoover—leaked both his and the JIC plans to reporter Walter P. Trohan of the anti-Roosevelt McCormick-Patterson press, which then published them word for word. Trohan, now living in retirement in Ireland, described Donovan's plan as a New Deal "super spy system" which would take over all American intelligence services, including the FBI, the Secret Service, ONI, and G-2; moreover, wrote Trohan, it would, "spy on the postwar world" and "pry into the lives of citizens at home." He called it a "super Gestapo agency." He said the Army and Navy agreed with Donovan's objective, but wanting the setup for themselves they had "declare[d] war on OSS."<sup>18</sup> Donovan cried "foul" and called in vain for an investigative body with subpoena powers; the culprit never was identified. His work was well done, however, for the JCS, taking shelter from congressional alarm at the prospect of an American "Gestapo," advised Roosevelt to drop the matter for the time being.

Within two months, however, Roosevelt, at the urging of economist Dr. Isadore Lubin, now with the Twentieth Century Fund, directed Donovan to resubmit his

<sup>18</sup> The Donovan Plan appeared in the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Washington Times-Herald*, and the *New York Daily News* on Feb. 9, 1945; the JIC Plan appeared in the first two papers on Feb. 11, 1945.



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proposal, this time to the Cabinet members. A week later, April 12, 1945, Roosevelt died, and Donovan lost a patron.

Contrary to a common misconception, Roosevelt and Donovan were never personally close, but the President liked "secret" intelligence, and he was quite happy to have the oldline bureaucracy stirred up by an intelligence chief of Donovan's "unlimited imagination and gall."<sup>19</sup> Roosevelt had created Donovan's post, sustained Donovan in office, and encouraged his postwar planning. Donovan had a fighting chance of winning FDR's support for his plan despite the departmental lineup against him. Columnist Drew Pearson was correct when two weeks after FDR's death he listed Donovan as one of those who would "miss Franklin Roosevelt most."<sup>20</sup> In truth Donovan and OSS were done for, but Donovan's plan would, as we shall see, rise Phoenix-like.

### *Clearing the Deck*

Pearson also noted that while Roosevelt had given Donovan "free rein, including grandiose plans for a postwar espionage service," the new President, Harry Truman did not like "peacetime espionage" and would not be "so lenient."<sup>21</sup> What role that attitude played in Truman's relationship with Donovan is not clear, but it is clear that there was no rapport between the two. Truman left an unmistakable indication of his disdain for Donovan when he summed up their first official meeting on May 14, 1945, with the comment that Donovan had come in "to tell how important the Secret Service [*sic*] is and how much he could do to run the government on an even basis."<sup>22</sup> In the succeeding weeks, Truman rebuffed every attempt by Donovan to discuss the future of OSS and the organization of a postwar central intelligence organization. Truman showed no interest in FDR's directed reconsideration of the Donovan plan, which State, War, Navy, and Justice agreed to shelve for the duration of the war. At war's end, when Truman and the Budget Bureau director, Harold D. Smith, were hurrying to dismantle the war machinery, Smith reported that Donovan was "storming" about the Bureau's proposed order abolishing OSS.<sup>23</sup> "Forget it" was the gist of the reply of the President, who observed that Donovan had been in that morning—to have an OSS hero meet the President—but they had not discussed the subject of abolition! Months later, Truman smilingly pinned a medal on Donovan, but then eleven days later, January 22, 1946, established, without soliciting Donovan's advice, a new national intelligence system—the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group. But that has taken us ahead of our story.

When Truman was catapulted into the presidency, he had had neither the need nor the occasion—nor the opportunity—under Roosevelt to become familiar with the intelligence situation. He had had nothing to do with the coordination of intelligence activities, with the collection, evaluation, and production of intelligence, with the conduct of espionage, counterespionage, or with clandestine military, political, and psychological warfare. He could have known little about the battle going on among the intelligence services.

<sup>19</sup> Joseph H. Rosenbaum, in an interview with the author Jan. 10, 1972. Rosenbaum, an OSS member, served in a liaison capacity between OSS and the White House in 1944-45.

<sup>20</sup> Drew Pearson, "Washington Merry-Go-Round," April 27, 1945.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> Margaret Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

<sup>23</sup> Diary entry, Sept. 13, 1945, Smith papers (Roosevelt Library) "Conferences with President Truman, 1945."

To compound this shortcoming, the President, having rejected Donovan as a guide to this new field, relied instead upon a very fine public servant but an equally poor intelligence counselor, Budget Director Smith. Smith had once been described by former Vice President Henry A. Wallace as "the most important man" in the Roosevelt administration.<sup>24</sup> That high regard was shared by Truman, who acknowledged Smith's expertise in handling government problems the day he asked Smith to stay in his job. One of the problems in which Smith thought himself and his staff particularly competent was intelligence.

Certainly they had had considerable experience with the administrative problems and the jurisdictional conflicts of the various intelligence services. The Bureau had been deeply involved in the problems of COI and OSS, had worked on the organizational problems of G-2 and ONI, and had kept close watch on the FBI's budget and plans for the future of the SIS. Finally, Bureau staff, believing State was the intelligence wave of the future, were happy to work on the department's internal problem. All this experience convinced the Bureau of its ability to advise the President on meeting the intelligence needs of the country in both peace and war.

Smith had already warned Roosevelt, after his return from Yalta, about the "Gestapo" charge; and, noting the "tug-of-war" among the intelligence agencies, asked the President to help him "hold the fort" against anyone—obviously Donovan and the military—who would try to take his time "prematurely" in the matter.<sup>25</sup> No sooner was Roosevelt dead—a week later in fact—than Smith made the same pitch to Truman and asked him to do nothing until the Bureau had its recommendations ready for him. For his part Truman opposed establishing a "Gestapo"—which made it unanimous—and vaguely referred throughout the summer to having something new "in mind," to an information rather than an investigative service, to "a broad intelligence service attached to the President's office," but he never did spell it out.<sup>26</sup> His invitation to Smith to do some thinking about it fitted in nicely with Bureau activity.

Nothing happened, however, until the war suddenly ended on August 15, and then actions—by Donovan, Truman, and the JCS—tumbled rapidly after one another until they reached a climax on September 20. First Donovan, responding to an inquiry from Harold Smith, suggested liquidation of OSS could be completed early in 1946, and to facilitate establishment of a new centralized system of intelligence, he submitted a new statement of principles as a point of departure. He circulated copies to the President, the JCS, and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. Moreover Donovan, stung by a spate of anti-OSS material once again fed to the McCormick-Patterson press, countered with his own barrage—the first in OSS history—of pro-OSS publicity and thereby brought the future of OSS into the open.

Meanwhile, Truman had initiated the abolition of such agencies as OSS. Smith's staff had drafted an executive order abolishing OSS and distributing its parts to the War and State departments. To the former they proposed sending the clandestine units and to the latter they would send the research and analysis and presentation units. The proposals were cleared with both departments before they were brought, rather belatedly, to the attention of either Donovan or the JCS. Getting the news about a

<sup>24</sup> Quoted in *Current Biography* 1943, p. 710.

<sup>25</sup> Memo, Smith to Roosevelt, Mar. 2, 1945, with enclosures, Records of the Bureau of the Budget, Record Group 51 (Office of Management and Budget, Wash., D.C.), Proj. 118, folder "Intelligence Functions, (AM-217)."

<sup>26</sup> Diary entries, Sept. 5, May 11, and Sept. 13, 1945, Smith Papers, *loc. cit.*

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week before the scheduled abolition, Donovan quickly sought the assistance of the JCS, who in turn moved to get a stay of execution—of their agency!—until they could study the matter and make their own recommendations.

Meanwhile also, the JCS had finally become seized of the problem of postwar intelligence. On the recommendation of the Army, worried about the atomic bomb and intelligence, the JCS had ordered the Joint Strategic Survey Committee—their advisory group—to review that JIC plan which had been shelved after the disastrous Trohan revelations in February. Now eager for action but fearing another “Gestapo” charge, the JSSC proposed, as their only change, specifically denying the proposed CIA any espionage function in the U.S. and any police powers anywhere in the world; but others, worrying that such denial implicitly constituted admission of foreign espionage, scratched the revision and returned to the very wording that had not been able to forestall the original charge! Then top Army planners, with the concurrence of the JSSC, yielded to G-2 pressure and—striking out an independent budget—made the CIA dependent on financial contributions from State, War, and Navy. The new agency, with its several functions and restrictions, was more dependent than ever on the three departments. Thus diluted, the plan was officially approved by the Joint Chiefs on September 18, 1945. They then rushed to send the plan to the secretaries of War and Navy for transmittal to the President and to hold up action on the abolition of OSS.

They were upstaged, however, by the President and Harold Smith who, unbeknownst to them, met in the President’s office at 3:00 P.M. on September 20 and effectively nullified—at least for the nonce—all the OSS and JCS hustling about. First, the President signed the order which abolished OSS on October 1, distributed its salvageable parts to the War and State departments, and dismissed Donovan, with nary a nod to his new statement of principles. That was Truman’s first step in reorganizing the country’s intelligence setup. The JCS learned the next day that it had been taken just two hours before their requested stay of execution had been received in the Budget Bureau!

When Truman signed the order, he remarked that he had “in mind a different kind of intelligence service from what this country has had in the past.”<sup>27</sup> Again he seems not to have spelled it out, but there was no need to do so. Smith, having briefed him on the completion of the long-awaited Budget Bureau study of intelligence, had another directive for him to sign. It was a letter instructing Secretary Byrnes to “take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies concerned with that type of activity.”<sup>28</sup> The Bureau also had a plan. Opposed to the military and interested in the coordination problem, the Bureau proposed the establishment of an interdepartmental coordinating mechanism dominated by State, and left other problems much to the future.

The situation was ridiculous. For more than a year and a half the State Department had not been able to establish its own new, unified intelligence office. Secondly, never had the Department evidenced any serious interest in “taking the lead” in developing any government-wide coordination of foreign intelligence activity. Finally, all it did have for such coordination were the recommendations of administrative and management specialists in the Bureau of the Budget. Nevertheless, State was in charge. Truman, having dismissed Donovan and apparently unaware of

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 13, 1945.

<sup>28</sup> Letter, Truman to Byrnes, Sept. 20, 1945, *Public Papers of the Presidents. Truman. 1945.* (GPO, Wash., D.C., 1961), p. 330.

the JCS plan, had draped the mantle of intelligence leadership on the one agency least able to do anything about it. It was his second step in the intelligence field, and both steps now led to much wandering in the wilderness.

### *Second Beginning*

Initially, however, there was considerable enthusiasm in part of State. Undersecretary Dean Acheson, with Byrnes's approval, snapped up Smith's offer of the OSS research and analysis and presentation units and almost as quickly had a man—a peacetime lawyer from G-2, Col. Alfred McCormack—on the job the day OSS was abolished. Within two months, however, McCormack, an abrasive person, had encountered the stiff opposition of the potent political desk officers who wanted no intelligence office inserted in State between themselves and both the Secretary and the President. Initial enthusiasm was gone by Christmas, and by April 1946, so were McCormack and his new office.

Meanwhile, McCormack had had to put the larger problem of organizing a government-wide system on a back burner, but the Army and Navy, rejoicing in the possession of their own plan and worrying about foreign tensions, would suffer no delay. First, the JCS plan had been incorporated in the Navy's so-called Eberstadt report, which envisioned a broad reorganization of the military-political structure for national security, and then personally and departmentally endorsed by Navy Secretary James F. Forrestal. Then, in the War Department, the plan was not only endorsed by Secretary Robert P. Patterson, but his Lovett Board also recommended a return to the idea of an independent budget for CIA. The Army preferred that, but the Navy was cool to the idea. Nevertheless, the military stood together. Eager for action, they disliked State's temporizing; they also wanted their plan implemented so the new agency could take over the R & A unit, which they disliked leaving in State. Hence, late in 1945, Forrestal and Patterson vigorously pushed the JCS plan at the White House, and McCormack felt the pressure. Embattled with his colleagues, he nevertheless had to take time to draft a plan with which to counter the military.

All McCormack had to go on was that Budget report, the assistance of Budget staff, and some charts and supporting papers they had prepared. That report did have some excellent observations on the nature and diversity of intelligence, the importance and validity of intelligence as a function of government, and the great need for better coordination among its collectors and producers. Getting to practical matters, the report primarily stressed the need to develop strong departmental intelligence services and therefore recognized only a small residual need for a central research staff for the President and for such centralized operations as espionage. Hence the report recommended the establishment of two high-level committees of assistant secretaries, a joint secretariat, and a host of subcommittees. It was a complicated, interdepartmental system. While essentially self-coordination almost at its theoretical best, it was meant to be dominated by State, and not surprisingly it was adopted by McCormack as the heart of State's plan.

It was strongly opposed, however, by Secretaries Forrestal and Patterson when they met with Byrnes in November, and it was also disliked by Byrnes himself. The military, who had found the Donovan plan too strong, found State's plan too weak. Its coordinating mechanism they considered unworkable; they objected to vesting State with the preparation of strategic estimates and to leaving centralized operations—espionage, biographical records, topographical studies, etc.—to future assignment to *ad hoc* organizations. In the background of military opposition was

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basic distrust of State itself; generals and admirals remembered the loose security practices of Secretary of State William Jennings Byran and the closing of the "Black Chamber" by Secretary Stimson; and they were currently witnesses to McCormack's embarrassing inability to organize a viable State intelligence unit. For his part, Byrnes found that McCormack structure too elaborate and too big.

Revision did not help. The plan still reflected State's own distrust of military domination of intelligence; it remained a State-run mechanism. The military stood fast for an agency responsible to the three cabinet secretaries and charged with the three functions of coordination, production, and operations. There were numerous major and minor issues on which both sides spent much time, defining, revising, and arguing. A meeting was even scheduled with the President but had to be postponed, because Byrnes could not resolve differences of opinion within the State Department. Harold Smith, frustrated with the failure of others to follow the Bureau's lead, complained to Truman on November 28, 1945, that the situation was "getting royally bitched up."<sup>29</sup>

Even so it was a month before Truman himself could take a look at both plans. "My inclination," he later wrote, "was to favor" the JCS plan.<sup>30</sup> That was not a difficult choice. There was a simplicity and coherence about the plan—an authority (NIA), a central agency (CIA), and an Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB)—which contrasted favorably with the complexity of State's revised offering—an NIA, an executive secretary, two advisory groups, nineteen committees, and indeterminate "centralized activities" to be activated in the indeterminate future. Truman's choice had a touch of irony. He had commissioned State to "take the lead," but after four months of his and State's wandering in the wilderness he had ended up endorsing the very plan—minimally modified—which the JCS had tried to get to him in September.

Truman apparently communicated his preference to Byrnes, who probably needed little nudging. In any case, Byrnes, meeting with Forrestal and Army Undersecretary Kenneth C. Royall, surrendered almost unconditionally; so the three secretaries on January 6, 1946, formally recommended adoption of the JCS plan. Truman was "ready to put it into effect," he wrote, but he held off, because Harold Smith wanted his people to make "a thorough analysis" of it.<sup>31</sup>

Smith's people, though forced to swallow the JCS plan, managed to change the nature of the proposed central agency. They made it so dependent on the three departments for funds, personnel, and facilities that it no longer qualified as an "agency." Instead it became "a cooperative interdepartmental activity,"<sup>32</sup> or "a group." Hence the projected CIA became instead the CIG. The military, prepared to accept anything as a beginning, agreed.

On January 22, 1946,<sup>33</sup> Truman, taking his third major step in intelligence, constituted the three cabinet secretaries and his (not a JCS) representative as the NIA and established the CIG to assist them. Their mission was the planning, development, and coordination of all federal foreign intelligence activities. The idea was approved by the press and public, which deemed the best intelligence possible a necessity for

<sup>29</sup> Diary entry, Nov. 28, 1945, Smith Papers, *loc. cit.*

<sup>30</sup> Harry S. Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> The phrase first appears in NIA Directive No. 1, Feb. 8, 1946 (CONF), OSS Records, Wash-Gen C-Ad 30.

<sup>33</sup> The document signed on this date was the letter Truman subsequently referred to as his "Executive Order." It can be found in Truman's *Public Papers*, 1946, pp. 88-89.

national survival. That included espionage; *Time* approvingly observed that the President "had put the U.S. in the business of international espionage."<sup>34</sup> Almost alone as a dissenter was Henry Wallace, who thought spying "Hellish."<sup>35</sup> Truman was pleased with what he had accomplished. He also thought the problem of intelligence was solved. He sat back to receive his "daily digest."<sup>36</sup>

#### *Permanency*

On the surface, NIA and CIG were impressive. The very names—National Intelligence Authority and Central Intelligence Group—gave to intelligence an ostensible stature that not even Donovan could have found wanting. Actually they were more appearance than substance.

First, CIG was literally nothing more than an interdepartmental committee subsisting on handouts of money, people, and facilities from three departments which—capriciously or otherwise—could withdraw their sustaining support at any moment. Also, while CIG could enumerate the many functions assigned to it, the embarrassing truth was that it lacked the power to carry them out. CIG could not hire people (or fire them), certify payrolls, authorize travel, procure supplies, or negotiate contracts. It could not do any business except through the medium of one of the departments. In short, it was fundamentally hobbled by substantive and administrative deficiencies which left both it and the NIA unequal to organizing all Federal foreign intelligence activities and operating the centralized services increasingly assigned it by the various departments.

Second, the NIA included the three cabinet secretaries, who had so many other pressing responsibilities that intelligence was bound to become, as Donovan argued it always had been, "the Orphan Annie"<sup>37</sup> of the services. Donovan described the NIA as "a good debating society but a poor administering instrument."<sup>38</sup>

There was an obvious solution—a grant of legal and financial independence. That of course required legislative action by Congress, and that was recommended by CIG's first director, Admiral Sidney W. Souers—and then vigorously pushed by its second chief, Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg. CIG sent drafts of enabling legislation to the White House, but they had a cool reception. Meanwhile there opened up an alternative legislative route, the merger or unification bill which eventually became the National Security Act of 1947.

The military had come to recognize that modern intelligence has a non-military as well as a military character, but they still thought of it as peculiarly their own field, in which they had the history and for which they had the qualifications. They had a big stake in the new CIG, and they certainly assumed that it would be headed alternately by an admiral and a general, and so it was—two admirals and a general in only a year and a half of existence. Fully aware of CIG's weaknesses, and appreciating the need for legislation, they had always found a place for it in their proposals.

Not until January 1947, however, had the military, who had many profound and bitter interservice arguments over the merger issue, been able to agree among themselves and with the White House on the grand design of the legislation to be

<sup>34</sup> *Time*, Feb. 4, 1946.

<sup>35</sup> "Wallace Decries Spying as Hellish," *New York Times*, Mar. 19, 1946.

<sup>36</sup> Harry S. Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

<sup>37</sup> Letter, Donovan to Gurney, May 7, 1974, Donovan Papers, "Central Intelligence, 1941-1950, Vol. 1."

<sup>38</sup> "Donovan Tells of Intelligence Agency's Flaws," *New York Herald Tribune*, c. April 10, 1946.

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submitted to Congress. To some extent they and the White House reached agreement by leaving many thorny issues for later decision. They wanted no more controversies than necessary. In that context they and the White House—the latter now resigned to CIG legislation—made brief provision for CIA in the unification bill Truman sent to Congress on February 26, 1947.

The bill's drafters had found the proposed CIG legislation too long and possibly troublesome, and therefore reduced it drastically. They briefly provided for a new agency—a big step forward—and subordinated it to another new organization, the National Security Council (NSC) which the Eberstadt report had put forth as the top policy-making body for national security. Second, they protected the military status, pay, and benefits of any military officer who might—as they expected—serve as Director of Central Intelligence. Finally, in a tactic that eventually boomeranged, they eliminated all reference to the functions, powers, relationships, and restrictions on the new agency; this they did by the expedient of a brief provision intended to give legislative effect to the President's directive of January 22, 1946. The eliminated portions, it was decided, could be better handled in separate CIA legislation.

Congress, when it took up the bill, was clearly ready for intelligence. No one accorded strategic intelligence anything less than the high status for which Donovan was the first to fight. No one did other than demonstrate he had learned a lesson taught by ten years of tension and war. Rep. Ralph E. Church (R., Ill.) spoke for all when he described intelligence as both "necessary for the proper functioning of our military machinery" and "of primary importance for the proper conduct of our foreign relations."<sup>39</sup>

With the possible exception of one die-hard opponent of the entire bill, Sen. Edward V. Robertson (R., Wyo.), all favored establishing an independent agency. Even Robertson apparently only opposed what he saw as military control of the agency, not the agency itself, much less intelligence. Indeed, no one raised any question about the need for such an agency or wondered whether the job might not be better done by an interdepartmental committee or some other device. A common view was that of Rep. W. J. Bryan Dorn (D., S. Car.) who, recalling people who thought that Hitler was "a comic character" and that Mussolini was "bluffing," declared "your Central Intelligence Agency is a very important part of this bill."<sup>40</sup>

Likewise, everyone accepted the bill's implicit inclusion of espionage. The fact was plainly stated by Rep. Chet Holifield (D., Cal.) who reassured the House that CIA's work was "strictly in the field of secret foreign intelligence—what is known as clandestine intelligence."<sup>41</sup> Accepting the fact, however, was not easy; Rep. Forest A. Harness (R., Ind.) had had "some fear and doubt about it" when he first considered the matter. The country, he explained, had "never before officially resorted to the collection of secret and strategic information in time of peace as an announced and fixed policy." However, he now was "convinced" that CIA was "essential to our national security."<sup>42</sup> Essential though it might be, Rep. Walter G. Andrews (R., N.Y.) wanted the thing done right because, as he said, "it is a great and dangerous departure for the American people to establish by law a 'spy agency,' which is what this agency will actually be."<sup>43</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 93, pt. 7, p. 9421.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9419.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9430.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9412.

<sup>43</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *National Defense Establishment (Unification of the Armed Services): Hearings on S. 758*, 80th Congress, 1st session, Mar. 25, 1947, p. 593.

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Congress did have two problems, however: One, there was very strong opposition to the idea of a military man heading CIA. Many, thinking the military had become too prominent, feared the growth of militarism. Others, visualizing some militaristic officer heading a national intelligence agency, feared the rise of a military "Gestapo." Still others, thinking the post of Director of Central Intelligence very important, did not like entrusting it to admirals and generals for short tours of duty between other assignments. And still others, viewing the job more in line with Donovan's concept, saw it as an essentially civilian post. In short, Congress passionately wanted a civilian DCI, but the very fact that an admiral—Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter—now was the third DCI and was expected to continue in the post, and the real possibility that the best man for the job might actually be a military man made it necessary to make provision for either a military or civilian occupant of the post. Though unhappy with the necessity, Congress won in the long run, because its attitude established the essentially civilian character of the DCI. Actually this accomplishment was the only new contribution Congress made to the theory and structure of CIA. The rest was copywork.

The other problem was provoked by the shortcutting tactic of the bill's drafters. Blurred out Maryland's Democratic Sen. Millard Tydings: "that is an awfully short bit of explanation, under the caption 'Central Intelligence Agency.'" He thought there was a "void" in the bill.<sup>44</sup> Of course there was, and a number of administration spokesmen hurried before committees of both Houses to explain that they had not wanted to overload the bill, that separate legislation was coming along, that the President's directive was carried over into the law, and that if that were not clear, then as one spokesman put it to a House committee, "eight or ten words"<sup>45</sup> would do the job. But neither Tydings nor numerous other objectors were mollified. House members were particularly vocal in insisting on having the functions and restrictions spelled out and not left to a parenthetical reference to an obscure presidential directive.

There were too many who had been exercised by the fear of a "Gestapo" to permit the establishment of a "spy agency" unless they first detailed what it could and could not do and where it could and could not operate. There were also many friends of the FBI who wanted to make sure that the DCI could not actually—physically—go into Hoover's office, into his files, into his cases, and thus blow his operations. There were also just as many experienced and suspicious anti-New Deal congressmen who had such an intense dislike of presidential directives and executive orders that they would not leave an intelligence agency to such dangerous instruments of presidential power. Others just did not like the shortcut. So the functions and limitations were spelled out. Except for further protecting the FBI, however, Congress hardly did more than copy out provisions—such as those on "services of common concern," police powers, "sources and methods," and "such other functions and duties"—that had long since been taken for granted. When the work was completed, Congress prided itself on this accomplishment; but being agreeable to everyone, it was no big thing.

Congress made one other change in the bill that had an important, but unintended, effect on CIA. Congress made the President the chairman of the NSC, and that meant that the DCI for the first time reported directly to the President, albeit as the chairman of the Council. Such reporting had always been opposed by the military and by State, but of course it had always been considered an essential characteristic of modern intelligence by Donovan, who as head of COI and OSS had

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 176.

<sup>45</sup> Admiral Forrest P. Sherman in U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department, *National Security Act of 1947: Hearings on H.R. 2319*, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, p. 181.



always reported to Roosevelt. The new arrangement—subordinating the CIA to an NSC headed by the President—was an unexpected solution to the old dilemma of giving the DCI too much freedom or too much external control. It gave the DCI access to the President, and yet it gave the NSC members, particularly Defense and State, a voice in CIA activities and productions. The solution coupled independence for CIA with subordination to an American version of Britain's old "King-in-Council" concept.

That surprising turn of events constituted what can be seen as a round trip between the zenith and the nadir in the institutionalization of the idea of the Central Intelligence Agency. What was launched by Donovan as a plan for a strong, independent agency was watered down by the JCS in their plan for an agency dependent upon State, War, and Navy, then devitalized by Truman when he established his "cooperative inter-departmental activity," and then—moving upward from this nadir—headed for a return to the JCS plan only to pass it by and wind up close to the original point of departure. In other words, in concept, structure, and functions, CIA as signed into law resembled the Donovan plan more than it did any other proposal put forth in the entire developmental process. And to add an ironic twist to this development, the man who proudly signed that law was of course none other than he who had no use for Donovan or his plan, Harry S. Truman.

For his role in the establishment of CIA, the former President does deserve some credit, but not as much as he gives himself. He wholeheartedly supported the warborn movement for a permanent American central intelligence organization but, new to the presidency and certainly hard-pressed by events, he had difficulty fashioning an intelligence policy for his administration. He, indeed, had made the choice of the JCS over the State or McCormack plan; and yet that was an easy choice, and beyond that he had made no contribution to the theory and structure of the CIA. He, indeed, had established the NIA and CIG and had provided the necessary executive push required for passage of the 1947 act; but surely he did no more than FDR would have done—and would have done more expeditiously. Truman did establish CIA, but in doing so he was very largely—however unknowingly—returning to the Donovan plan of 1944. He really only put the capstone on the work done by Donovan (and Stephenson) and Roosevelt.

### *Second Thoughts*

Surprisingly enough for a history buff, Truman persisted in ignoring his indebtedness to others; CIA remained "his invention." This misconception inevitably spawned in him other misconceptions about the Agency. Nowhere are these more apparent than in his syndicated article<sup>46</sup> which appeared in 1963 and then was widely reprinted in 1975 after the *New York Times* leveled charges of "massive illegal domestic" spying by the CIA and thereby provoked unprecedented criticism and examination of much Agency activity.

In that article Truman denounced CIA, which he termed "this quiet intelligence arm of the President," for becoming diverted—as he saw it—from the "original

<sup>46</sup>"Harry Truman Writes: Limit CIA Role to Intelligence," *Washington Post*, Dec. 22, 1963, p. A-11. For an interesting inquiry into the authorship of this article see Benjamin F. Onate, "What Did Truman Say About CIA?" *Studies in Intelligence* Vol XVII/3, (Fall, 1973), pp. 9-11. The author establishes that the article was not written by the former President but by an assistant, David Noyes; doubt is also raised as to whether the President ever saw the article prior to its publication. On this latter point see later footnote on letter to Admiral Souers.

assignment" he had given it and for becoming "an operational and at times a policy-making arm of the Government." According to him, the agency's assignment had been the collection of intelligence reports from all sources and their conveyance to the President in their "'natural raw' state and in as comprehensive a volume" as he could handle and free of "departmental 'treatment' or interpretations" so that he could do his "own thinking and evaluating." It had not been his expectation, he said, that CIA would be "injected into peacetime cloak and dagger operations."<sup>47</sup>

Whatever Truman thought in 1947 or 1963 about CIA's "original assignment," it now ought to be clear that the 1947 Act had a history that precluded the possibility of Truman being the sole and infallible expositor of what that assignment was. It should also be clear that history made the Agency's functions far more numerous and sophisticated than simply funneling "raw" intelligence to the President. It should also be clear that throughout that history no one the least interested in the subject was excusably ignorant of espionage as a part of the Agency's functions; and despite his disavowal of "peacetime cloak and dagger operations," Truman, as we shall see, was probably not ignorant of the fact either.

Only two points made by Truman remain to be considered. The first, "policy-making," is easily disposed of; whether the Agency has or has not become such an "arm of the Government" is clearly beyond the scope of this article, but certainly no one is ever known to have held that such a function was part of the "original assignment."

On the second, the "operational," point, Truman is on good but not unassailable ground. The "assignment" did not explicitly include "covert operations." (Presumably these at least are what Truman had reference to when he employed such ambiguous language as "operational" and "peacetime cloak and dagger operations." The Agency was designed to be "operational," that is, to perform various services and functions, such as the conduct of espionage.) However, no sooner did the international situation in 1947-52 virtually invite American covert operations in Greece, Italy, and elsewhere than President Truman's administration, reading the 1947 Act and scrutinizing resources at hand, found the new CIA the most convenient instrument to use. In other words, Truman in 1947-52 seems to have accepted covert operations as an implicit part of CIA's "original assignment."

If by 1963 he had changed his mind—and there is some doubt as to whether he actually did—he seems not to have renounced covert operations *per se* but only their conduct by "his invention." In that 1963 article, in a paragraph which is invariably overlooked, especially by critics of all covert operations, Truman—throwing syntax and punctuation to the winds—wrote this recommendation:

I, therefore, would like to see the CIA be restored to its original assignment as the intelligence arm of the President, and that whatever else it can properly perform in that special field—and that its operational duties be terminated or properly used elsewhere.

That last word "elsewhere" surely demonstrates that Truman was only slightly more helpful than the JIS civilians who in 1944 thought "subversive operations abroad" not the "appropriate function" of an intelligence service but failed to say to whom they were "appropriate." Truman at least positively assigned them "elsewhere."

<sup>47</sup>"Truman Writes: Limit CIA Role," see footnote above.

Truman's recommendation brings us back to espionage. That Truman knew CIA was intended to be a "spy agency" might be deducible from that elliptical reference to "whatever else it can properly perform in that special field." Anything else could certainly have been expressed in a less obviously veiled manner.

While Truman apparently did not actually write that 1963 article, an exchange of correspondence with Admiral Souers<sup>48</sup> shortly after its appearance demonstrates his familiarity with and endorsement of it. About the same time—after the Bay of Pigs—he was privately telling Merle Miller that CIA was "a mistake," which "if I'd known what was going to happen, I never would have done it."<sup>49</sup>

Miller does point out some ambiguity between some public and private statements of Truman's,<sup>50</sup> and while some people tend to stress this ambivalence, and to suggest that memory and old age had gotten the better of the former President, the weight of the evidence suggests that Truman, however proud he originally was of his role in the establishment of CIA, did have some unhappy second thoughts. The conclusion here is that to the extent he had such thoughts they are directly traceable to his own ignorance of the history of that event.

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<sup>48</sup> Letters, Souers to Truman, Dec. 27, 1963, and Truman to Souers, Jan. 17, 1964, Papers of Sidney Souers (Truman Library, Independence, Mo.) Souers, congratulating Truman on the Dec. 22, 1963, article, criticized Allen W. Dulles for "caus[ing] the C.I.A. to wander far from the original goal established by you . . ." In reply, Truman said he was "happy . . . that my article rang a bell with you because you know exactly why the organization was set up—it was set up so the President would know what was going on." That Truman actually wrote this letter seems evident from the postscript written apparently by him: "The girls aren't working today—so I fold'em and lick'em myself!"

<sup>49</sup> Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 419.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 420. Miller observed that "publicly Mr. Truman continued to uphold the CIA. This was one of the few areas in which what he said publicly differed from what he said privately." As evidence, he cites a passage in the 1971 *Esquire* article cited in footnote 2 above; Truman is quoted therein as noting that CIA is "still going, and it's going very well." This writer could not locate the remark in the place given.

*How we got into the  
newspaper business*

## THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Nathan Nielsen

In the vaulted Special Printing Plant on the seventh floor of Headquarters stands a blue-gray Miehle offset press that makes a curious "whisch-whisch" sound as it operates. This German-made press is very handy for printing booklet pages, and for decades the producers of national intelligence have served up their material in the form of booklets. Thus, nothing sounded unusual in the Special Printing Plant before dawn on January 10, 1974, as the press emitted its customary "whisch-whisch." But something looked highly irregular. The press was not printing booklet pages; instead, it was spreading out the sensitive, highly classified substance of national intelligence in the form of a newspaper. A *tabloid* newspaper.

The newspaper consisted of one sheet, 17 by 22 inches, printed on both sides and folded to form four pages. Unlike many tabloids, this one offered headlines of modest size and careful statement. Compactly arranged with a section of general information plus seven geographical and topical sections, it presented 31 intelligence items, three maps, a chart, and a picture. Its four pages carried some 7,000 words, the equivalent of what intelligence consumers normally find in 26 booklet pages. The Central Intelligence Agency seal stood next to the name of the newspaper: the *National Intelligence Daily*. Beneath the name appeared a notice: "Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only."

Volume 1, Number 1 carried an introductory statement signed by the DCI:

This is the first edition of the *National Intelligence Daily*. The newspaper format permits the reader to make his own choices. He can scan the front page. He can read selectively from it and from the other pages.

The *Daily* contains at least three times as much intelligence as its predecessor, the *Central Intelligence Bulletin*. This enables the reader to note the highlights or follow important intelligence problems in depth, and at the same time and in the same place, to note issues of secondary importance and immediacy. The format also enables us to offer longer feature stories on issues of topical interest. Because a number of previously separate publications have been brought together here, the substantive material can be more varied.

The *Daily* will be a security hazard. It will contain material from all available sources dealing with policy matters of great sensitivity. A single issue exposes a broader range of sources and subject matter than did its predecessor publications. No copies or clippings may be made, nor may the *Daily* be passed on to staffs, as stories in the *Daily* could be mislaid in a stack of newspapers.

Handling procedures have been devised to help reduce these risks, but the reader's cooperation will still be necessary. *It is essential to keep this publication, and particularly its contents, inviolate.*

Finally, the *Daily* is frankly an experiment; changes will no doubt be made. We want it to carry the kind of intelligence information a highly selective list of readers needs. When it misses the mark, let us know.

MORI/HRP  
from pg.  
39-51

*A Suggestion From 1952*

The departure from a conventional presentation of intelligence may have appeared abrupt, but the concept was well aged. William E. Colby had suggested it to the late Allen Dulles in 1952, while Mr. Dulles was in the tub in Stockholm, but the idea went down the drain with the bath water. In 1966, Mr. Colby raised the idea again. The Office of Current Intelligence prepared a mock-up of intelligence in newspaper form, but informed him that the difficulties involved were too great to justify further work on the project. In the summer of 1973, after his appointment as DCI, Mr. Colby once more asked whether OCI could produce a newspaper. On that occasion, he reached into a drawer and pulled out a document he had saved for seven years, the mock-up of intelligence in newspaper form that just about everyone else had long forgotten.

OCI brushed aside jeers, sneers, and cracks about classified ads, crossword puzzles, and funnies, and in July 1973 got down to serious work. The work had to be serious because the problems were indeed immense, and there was considerable doubt as to the wisdom and feasibility of the project. It was clear from the beginning that a newspaper could not be done on the cheap, as just another by-product of OCI's usual activities. It would be a major project, one that would draw in substantial manpower and would necessarily regulate many other activities. The cost would be worthwhile only if it provided a better way of informing OCI's primary audience, the officers of government who make up the National Security Council, its subcommittees, and their senior staffs. Most important, OCI was not confident that an intellectually respectable product could be produced in this format, and was uncertain whether that product would be recognized and accepted as such by the readers for whom it was intended. OCI had to break new ground; a successful intelligence newspaper would have to meld the professional and technical standards of the newspaperman with those of the intelligence officer.

*Questions of Function and Efficiency*

The problems loomed as hard questions to answer. For example:

—A newspaper is a medium of mass communication, but sensitive intelligence must circulate only among a few subscribers. Why build a sledge hammer to pound tacks?

—Even a mere four-page tabloid would give consumers three times their usual intelligence fare. Would they accept that much? And could the producers suddenly triple the output of what normally goes into a generalized intelligence publication? As quantity rose, would quality fall?

—National intelligence involves coordination, which takes time. A newspaper operation requires speed. Could the intelligence community compress the coordination of more material into less time?

—The number of pages in a booklet can go up or down in accord with the ups and downs in daily intelligence production. A four-page newspaper would offer the same amount of space, for 7,000 words, day in and day out. Could the editors of a newspaper reconcile uneven production with steady consumption?

—The consumers of an intelligence newspaper would have habits and attitudes that are not easily changed. They might tend to think that any newspaper takes a casual rather than a responsible approach and offers

sketchiness rather than comprehensiveness. Could they be persuaded to view seriously that which came to them in a format often associated with the frivolous?

—A booklet that contains certain categories of intelligence is supposed to have a cover, like the top slice of bread on a ham sandwich. A newspaper with a cover would not look like a newspaper. Would serving the meat of intelligence as an open-faced sandwich violate security requirements?

—The equipment and skills at hand were for making booklets, not a newspaper, and the budget did not allow for heavy capital investment. Could the machinery and know-how already committed to booklets be adapted efficiently to a new form of publication?

#### *Calculations and Samples*

In the initial attack on the technical problems, OCI used the composers in its Publications Support Branch to produce justified lines of type. The Technical Support Branch, Cartography Division, Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, created headlines on a machine customarily used for putting captions on illustrations. The Visual Information and Design Branch of the Cartography Division designed nameplates and security warning sections. Within two weeks, the first sample newspaper rolled off the press in the Special Printing Plant of Printing Services Division.

In the next four weeks, OCI and its support elements experimented with various type sizes, column widths, headline styles, map and picture presentations, page designs, and organizational patterns.

The calculations started with the Miehle press, the only readily available unit that could run off a sheet of paper large enough to constitute two newspaper pages. The Miehle had a limitation: it could print no sheet larger than 19 by 25 inches. It had a customary setting, for a sheet 17 by 22 inches on which four booklet pages could be printed simultaneously. The newspaper experiments had to proceed without disrupting regularly scheduled production. It was practical, therefore, to keep the press at the 17 by 22 inch setting. This dictated the size of the newspaper. It would be a tabloid, folded into pages 11 inches wide and 17 inches high.

Five columns would appear too squeezed on a small page. Also, the narrower the column, the more hyphens at the ends of justified lines of type. Three wider columns would ease the hyphenization problem but would give a small page more of a magazine look than a newspaper look. Four columns, each about as wide as a column in the *Wall Street Journal*, seemed to present the most acceptable appearance, as did body type of normal newspaper size.

#### *Generalized, Specialized, and Systematic*

The intelligence newspaper would have to provide an orderly presentation of developments that are often chaotic. Such an arrangement would serve as a functional guide for reading the newspaper and would also reflect the newspaper's relationship with other intelligence publications. The newspaper would put together, in one document, the essential intelligence that policy makers usually had to seek out in several documents. Pages 1 and 4 would carry the principal and latest developments that readers were accustomed to find in generalized intelligence publications; pages 2 and 3 would provide some of the background materials that appear in specialized

intelligence publications. A systematic production flow, with background information and items of less urgency going into the first press run (pages 2 and 3) and the most significant and current intelligence going into the last press run (pages 1 and 4), would contribute to a logical arrangement.

From the beginning, the work proceeded in consultation with the Office of Security, for security was an obvious problem. Someone could mislay the *Daily* amid sections of the *Post* or *Times*, or shove the intelligence newspaper under a pile of unclassified material. The *Daily* would carry, on the same page, several articles of varying classification and sensitivity. Decorating every page with enough security warnings to give conventional notice of the document's sensitivity would result in something that looked more like a circus poster than a newspaper. The Office of Security cooperated in the development of terse warning notices and security markings sufficient to flag the newspaper as highly classified without obscuring its message under typographical clutter.

The wider the circulation, the higher the security risk. The *Daily*, therefore, would go only to a few top policy makers. Similarly, few within the Agency would receive the newspaper. Most consumers of intelligence, and most producers, would continue to receive conventional publications—booklets—that are less of a security hazard than the *Daily*.

One modest protection devised for the *Daily*—and one that can be employed efficiently only with a strictly limited distribution of intelligence newspapers—was a jacket in which the newspaper would arrive on the policy maker's desk. The jacket would shield the newspaper's contents from accidental unauthorized inspection and would bear an "eyes only" label naming the authorized recipient. The use of color on the jacket and on the pre-printed portion of the *Daily* would emphasize the security markings.

#### *Speed in Black, White, and Gray*

Except for use in pre-printed security markings, color was a printing luxury the *Daily* could not afford. The loss of color in maps would be the price of speed. Printing colored maps on the Miehle press would take hours; the *Daily*, if it was to be current, would have to get on and off the press in minutes. Agency cartographers, who through many years had earned a reputation for excellence in creating colored maps, now had to develop a new map technology in black, white, and shades of gray.

As the cartographers worked out the new technology, the printers changed their ways of reproducing both maps and photographs. In offset printing, texts and headlines are pasted on a layout sheet. The printers photograph this sheet to get the image from which they will make a press plate. This is fairly simple when the image consists of black and white; the camera catches it all in one exposure. But the gray tones in photographs that have to go on the press plate cause problems; the camera cannot capture these tones accurately for the press plate at the same instant it registers the black-white image of the type. In the old way of preparing a press plate that included illustrations, the reproduction of photographs required extra camera work and hand work *after* texts and headlines were photographed on the layout sheet. Persisting with the old time-consuming way of putting photographs on the press plate would have forced either an early deadline or a late press run. What the *Daily* needed was a late deadline and an early press run.

To break through the time barrier, the Printing Services Division exploited the photo-mechanical transfer process. What this amounts to is photographing a picture

through a screen that breaks the gray tones into patterns of black dots. The image thus produced, which in the process is reduced to one- or two-column size, can be pasted on the layout sheet along with the type. The camera catches it all, the type and the clusters of black dots that represent the pictures, in one exposure. To the camera eye the screened pictures appear as black dots; to the human eye the black dots appear as pictures, in tones of gray. The photo-mechanical transfer takes less time than conventional photography, and the work is performed *before* the layout deadline. This and other production innovations would help the *Daily* achieve one of its principal goals: currency.

#### *Headlines: Hazardous Journalistic Art*

If the consumers were to take the intelligence newspaper seriously, the newspaper had to present a serious appearance. This is more difficult to achieve in a tabloid than in a newspaper of standard dimensions. In a tabloid, headlines do not have to get very large and bold before they convey an image of sensationalism; yet headlines too small and too light tend to resemble those in a mimeographed house organ.

When an over-simplification or a misleading term has slipped into the text of an article, the discriminating reader often can make a quick interpretive adjustment that corrects the error, so far as his own understanding is concerned. He finds, within the balance of the article, information that keeps the message straight. He may pass over a small deviation in the message, just as he may not notice a typographical error. But when an over-simplification or a misleading term appears in a headline, even the most discriminating reader may get the wrong message. If he reads only the headline, he will retain only the misconception. If he reads the article, the errant headline still may have left an impression so strong that it clouds the reader's perception of the message conveyed in the text.

Distorted headlines, a problem in the commercial press, are a far more serious problem when they affect the substance of national intelligence. *Daily* editors, therefore, would have to pay particular attention to headline accuracy. It is difficult under any circumstances to capture, in eight words, the essence of an 800-word article. It is more difficult to write such a headline when the words must fit within a given number of character spaces, and when various letters of the alphabet take up various amounts of space. It is still more difficult to compose headlines of precision, both in content and in length, when time is running out. Headline writing was one of the more challenging journalistic arts the *Daily* editors would have to master.

#### *More Resources Committed*

From the first four experimental newspapers, OCI selected the elements that would determine the appearance of a fifth sample. This one came close enough to the mark so that OCI prepared a sixth, seventh, and eighth to be tried out on a few picked consumers. The early indications of demand for the proposed new product were positive enough to warrant committing more resources to the project.

In September, OCI assigned four pairs of editors to newspaper drills. The editors would paw through the day's output of finished intelligence for regular publications, reshape the drafts into newspaper articles, write headlines, design page layouts, and rush the material into production. The trainees often discovered that a normal day's output of finished intelligence did not quite fill a newspaper. Then they would scratch up more. The editors had a word for their drills: frenzy.



Initiating substantive intelligence officers into the techniques of journalism was one problem; maintaining substantive depth and breadth was another. Each team, therefore, would consist of a senior editor and an associate editor, each with a different area of expertise. In assembling the editorial teams, OCI reached into the substantive strength of all its division.

#### *The Whip and the Wee Hours*

With editors and production workers developing the skills that would give form to the newspaper, it was time to bring analysts into the drills. Articles written especially for the newspaper began to appear in the sample. Analysts, writing on deadline for regularly scheduled publications, found themselves called upon to write on deadline for the newspaper, too. "Dry run" hardly seemed the appropriate term for exercises that had so much sweat in them. Moreover, the whip kept cracking after the normal close of business. Any morning newspaper with pretensions of currency must have writers on the job well into the wee hours.

The night of October 2-3, 1973, saw the first real-time drill. The troops went home groggy in the morning, but they had put out a snappy newspaper, on time.

The analysts and editors had barely returned to normal business hours when war erupted in the Middle East. War or no war, the newspaper dry runs ground on in every aspect except, on three sample issues, the printing.

With form jelling, substance percolating, and the entire office running through newspaper drills, it was time to bring in other heavy contributors of current intelligence, principally the Office of Economic Research and the Office of Strategic Research. With the scope of the newspaper project thus broadened, it was also time to select a senior officer to manage *Daily* operations and articulate *Daily* doctrines.

One of this officer's first tasks was to explain newspaper writing style to the analysts. In the old booklet style, a general statement introduced the topic, the reporting came next, and the analysis concluded the article. In the new style, the analytical clincher would appear high in the article, followed by the reporting in paragraphs and sentences arranged in a descending order of importance. An orderly arrangement of articles would require precise copy fitting. Any article might have to be cut to fit. At deadline the cutting would be done with a knife, and the cuts would come from the bottom.

#### *Fresh Approach to Intelligence*

In seminars with those who would be writing for the newspaper, editors went into the rationale for the *Daily*—how it presented a fresh approach to intelligence; how headline size and story placement could convey the relative significance of items more precisely than could the arrangement of similar items in booklets; how the newspaper could incorporate maps and pictures more effectively and rapidly than could booklets; how the problem-oriented background information that policy makers need could get to them on a more timely basis in the newspaper than in publications for specialists; how a carefully organized newspaper presentation could give policy makers a daily intelligence briefing broad enough to touch on the major issues, current enough to cover early-morning developments, deep enough to explore complicated problems, and general enough to discuss a wide variety of topics.

Agency officials, meanwhile, briefed the policy makers on what they could expect from the newspaper. The talking paper stressed readability, coverage, and currency. In

pointing to what the reader could get from the newspaper, the talking paper commented: "We could not provide the same choices in conventional ways without confronting the reader with a formidable and unmanageable pile of papers every morning."

The struggle for efficiency had produced dividends. The *Daily* could present more information on less paper than could conventional intelligence publications. With technical innovations that led to faster ways of reproducing pictures and maps, with the installation of phototypesetting equipment, and with production flow systems that were getting smoother, the *Daily* was winning the battle for currency. In the months ahead it would scoop the morning metropolitan newspapers on events such as the Indian nuclear explosion and the coups in Portugal and Cyprus.

#### *A Resolution of Contradictions*

The great contradictions had been resolved. *Who* gets the newspaper is more important than *how many* get the newspaper. The *Daily's* purpose is not to conform to the newspaper stereotype of a mass circulation medium; it is to convey, with the efficiency of a newspaper, intelligence to a few selected subscribers at the highest level of government. The consumers can select what they want from the expanded intelligence fare. For their purposes, scanning a newspaper is more efficient than digging through a stack of booklets. The producers can triple the amount of what normally goes into a generalized intelligence publication, and they can sustain the quality. On mornings when intelligence of significance runs short, the *Daily* can appear in a two-page version. The newspaper can select material prepared for other purposes, and some material prepared for the newspaper can be disseminated in other ways to consumers who do not receive the *Daily*.

Coordination can work, so long as it does not mire down in haggling over commas. Astute editorial management can channel uneven production into steady consumption. Consumers can be persuaded to give a new product a fair trial. A jacket can replace a cover as a security mechanism. Those who are good at making booklets also can teach themselves to be good at making a newspaper.

#### *Staff and Publications Structure*

In late November 1973, the DCI decided to proceed with the *Daily* on an experimental basis. The laboratory newspapers had met with success. Still, OCI recognized that the dry-run issues had had the benefit of novelty, of unusual attention, and of stockpiled material. The real test would come when consumers depended upon the *Daily* for their main intelligence fare, when contributors to the newspaper were producing routinely, when night duty became a grind, and when material ran thin. To prepare for the test, OCI established the National Intelligence Daily Staff with a chief serving as managing editor of the *Daily*, a special assistant to the managing editor, and four rotating editorial teams.

OCI revised the publications structure to provide:

- Material for the President and Vice President.
- The *Daily* for the Vice President, Cabinet members, the National Security Council staff, and a few additional officers.

- The *Central Intelligence Bulletin*, to be reconstituted with a larger intelligence community input as the *National Intelligence Bulletin*, for other policy-makers.<sup>1</sup>
- Semi-formal staff notes containing finished intelligence prepared by OCI's divisions for specialized customers.
- The weekly intelligence publications.
- For rapid response, spot reports disseminated electrically.

At year's end, construction men carved out office space for the *Daily*. In the first week of January, 1974, those who had been drawn into the newspaper project—analysts, cartographers, editors, publication typists, proofreaders, layout men, printers, couriers—completed the production and in-house dissemination of four final sample issues. After 33 dry runs, the *Daily* was ready to go to press for real, Monday through Saturday, as long as its readers wanted it.

#### *"An Experimental Publication"*

On January 10, 1974, the first official edition of the *Daily* went to less than three dozen principals in the White House, the Cabinet, the National Security Council, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense. Vice President Ford headed the list of subscribers. (The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs reported that President Nixon preferred no change in the way he received his intelligence materials, and therefore would not read the intelligence paper.)

The *Daily's* own masthead labeled it "an experimental publication." It was experimental not only for the producers but also for the consumers, who would require time to get used to the unconventional presentation of intelligence, and who during the experiment would receive no other kind of daily intelligence publication from CIA.

In spring it was time to discover whether the experiment had succeeded. Questionnaires went to the readers. Did they find the *Daily* more accurate than the *Post* and *Times*? Or less? More focused on policy issues? Or less? Merely repetitive? Easier to read and digest? Or less? Did the readers scan the headlines and select? Read the summary and select? Read the *Daily* cover to cover? Did they find the feature articles useful? Did the *Daily* meet their daily intelligence needs except for longer studies and estimates? Did the *Daily* offer the right balance between current reporting and analytic treatment? Did coordination make the *Daily* more useful? Did they prefer the *Daily* as is? With changes? A more conventional presentation of current intelligence? A daily oral briefing?

By June the returns were in. Three fourths of the respondents were favorably inclined toward the *Daily*.

#### *Costs: Tangible and Intangible*

The experiment had run up costs in OCI, with 12 people assigned to it full time and heavy time requirements from analysts and line managers, including a skeleton night shift. The project made waves that affected OER, OSR, OGCR, the Office of Scientific Intelligence, the Office of Weapons Intelligence, the Central Reference Service, and the Printing Service Division. Money costs were relatively small and

<sup>1</sup>In May, 1976, the *Bulletin* was replaced with the National Intelligence Daily Cable, produced from *Daily* articles.

manageable. There were intangible costs in the memorandums and special reports that analysts had not prepared because they were caught up in producing for the *Daily*, and most important, there were substantial costs in human wear-and-tear.

Currency exacts a toll. Before the advent of the *Daily*, analysts generally could complete their work during normal business hours. They might draw occasional night duty as task force members in crisis periods, but for the most part they could wait until the following morning to attend to things that occurred at night. This is not so with the *Daily*. It requires reportorial and analytical updating through the night, six nights a week, and that requires the presence of night representatives from each of the five divisions of OCI as well as from OER and the Regional Analysis Division of OSR. That much analytical manpower at night means less analytical manpower available during the day. Night duty also has physical side effects, creates analytical continuity gaps, and disrupts schedules to a degree that can be irritating.

The *Daily* requires firm editing, and this can bruise analysts. An OCI memorandum observed:

"Editors, like death and taxes, will be with us always and will attract the same measure of affection. The *Daily* by its nature requires the attention of more editors than any other publication OCI has ever produced. This fact has magnified an old OCI bugbear—levels of editorial review. . . .

"Some characteristics of the editing on the *Daily* are common to other OCI publications, some are quite different. The main differences are: The *Daily* processes a far larger amount of copy each day, and the greater part of the processing takes place after the normal working day. The *Daily* also introduces headlines and layout, along with the peculiar problems of finite space. . . .

"The late nature of much of the work on the *Daily* means that, compared to the *Bulletin* and the *Weekly*, the analyst has lost a measure of control over his product. He cannot, for example, take part in writing a headline for his story unless he is prepared to stay around half the night. He may not see the final edited version of his story. . . .

"Textual editing will frequently seem capricious to the author, and some of it will even seem brutal. . . .

There was no magic wand to make such problems go away. In June 1974, weighing the costs against the results, OCI recommended that the DCI establish the *Daily* as CIA's primary periodical for the policy-level officer. The DCI accepted the recommendation, and the "experimental publication" label went off the *Daily's* masthead.

#### *Character of the Daily*

Each issue of the *Daily* carries the intelligence that the editors believe will prove most useful to policy makers that day. No edition could be considered typical, but any could illustrate the kinds of things the *Daily* offers.

For example, the *Daily* on May 17, 1976 offered five items of intelligence on page 1:

—An analysis of a Chinese leftist pronouncement commemorating the tenth anniversary of the opening of the Cultural Revolution.

--A judgment that the growth rate for industrial production in the USSR this year will be the lowest since the end of World War II if first-quarter trends continue.

--A report on Syria's severe financial setback, caused by a temporary suspension of subsidy payments by Saudi Arabia and other Arab donors, the recent cut-off of oil pipeline transit payments by Iraq, and the cost of Syrian operations in Lebanon—estimated at \$750,000 a day.

--A discussion of Moscow's attitude toward Syria's policy in Lebanon.

--A situation report on Lebanon.

The *Daily* devoted pages 2 and 3 to:

--A feature on EC relations with the Arab states.

--A feature on Botswana's policy toward Rhodesia.

--The outlook for the Free Democrats in West Germany.

--Observations on the similarity between the assassination of the Bolivian ambassador to France in May 1976 and the murder of the Uruguayan military attaché in France in December 1974.

--An assessment of the Peruvian president's campaign to shift his government to a more centrist position.

Page 4 carried the continuations of three articles from page 1, plus:

--The reactions of Italy's non-Communist parties to Communist chief Berlinguer's call for the creation, after the election in June, of an emergency government consisting of all parties except the neo-fascists.

--Discussion of a statement on the Eritrean problem by the chairman of Ethiopia's ruling military council.

--Reporting on arrangements for Cuba to train Jamaican police officers in techniques to counter urban guerrilla warfare.

Other items of intelligence available for the issue of May 17, 1976, were set into type but were not published, because of space limitations. These items were held as "overset," available for publication at a later date.

Just as strong players on the bench give a football team depth, so solid items in "overset" give the *Daily* a reservoir of material that it can play at the appropriate time. Analysts, naturally, prefer to see their articles played immediately rather than to have them placed for a day or two in "overset," which they view as limbo. Editors, on the other hand, see great utility in "overset." It increases their options and sharpens the selectivity process. They can draw from it and replenish it—that is, have their cache and eat it, too. "Overset," properly managed, helps reconcile uneven production with steady consumption.

The *Daily* has some of the content of other intelligence publications, but differs from them in form; it has some of the form of commercial newspapers, but differs from them in content.

The *Daily* was never intended to compete with or duplicate the commercial press on foreign news coverage, for it does not have the space to do so. Still, it must be more

current than the commercial press in covering significant foreign news developments, for that is what its readers require of it. In achieving currency, the *Daily* has notable advantages:

- Classified information, which often can illuminate a development earlier and more precisely than can information from open sources.
- Analytical expertise, which can detect the significance of a situation before such knowledge comes to public attention.
- Deadlines four or five hours later than those under which commercial morning newspapers operate.

The latter advantage is a dividend of technological innovations that whack sizable chunks off the production time required between deadline and the start on the press run. It is a dividend, also, of the *Daily's* small circulation. The fewer the copies, the less time on the press and in packaging and distribution.

The *Daily's* function, that which distinguishes it from the commercial press, goes much farther than scoring incidental scoops on foreign news developments. The *Daily* focuses finished, all-source, national intelligence on U.S. foreign policy issues for a select readership—the officials who have to contend with policy problems. Whenever possible, the *Daily* must do more than tell the policy maker what happened yesterday; it must tell him what is likely to happen tomorrow, and why. Part of the *Daily's* analytical service to the policy maker is selectivity—not burdening him with articles that have no bearing on policy.

It is one thing to aim at a target, and another to hit it. If the *Daily* errs, it runs a correction. A newspaper cannot hide its blemishes; it can improve only when those responsible are alerted to the errors they have made. The *Daily* does not have the option of printing several morning editions and correcting in later press runs those errors that occurred in the first edition. It has to strive to be right the first time.

#### *One Day and Night in the Life of the Daily*

The *Daily* cycle begins with the cables and reports that constitute the raw material of intelligence. Analysts scan the material and propose articles. These proposals, developed in branch and division sessions, emerge as items in a budget put together during a planning meeting at 1100.<sup>2</sup> It is not enough that an analyst propose, say, an item on relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh; he must estimate, also, the number of column inches that item will require in the *Daily*.<sup>3</sup> These column-inch estimates, when totaled, give the editors an idea of what volume to expect and contribute to decisions on what must get into the next edition, and what can wait another day or so. The editors, meanwhile, inform the cartographers of map requirements and scout out picture possibilities through the Central Reference Service.

Coordination of a draft within the intelligence community takes place while the editors work over the draft for publication in the *Daily*. Either process can make sparks fly. A disagreement in coordination can result in publication of a dissenting view. In the normal course of business, however, what emerges from coordination and editing is

<sup>2</sup>Representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency participate in the planning meeting and assist with draft coordination throughout the afternoon. A representative of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, also works on coordination in the *Daily* offices during the afternoon.

<sup>3</sup>At this writing, the *Daily* has not converted its length estimates from inches to centimeters.

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a draft that accurately and succinctly expresses the views of the intelligence community on a given problem.

Shortly after 1800, senior OCI officers conduct an editorial meeting in the *Daily* offices. A representative of the White House Support Staff participates. Out of this session come decisions on what the *Daily* and other publications will carry, and what play the most important articles will get. This meeting also produces suggestions on features for future editions. Bylined features that probe more comprehensively into significant problems have become one of the *Daily's* principal qualitative strong points, as well as a quantitative mainstay in the grind of Monday-through-Saturday publication.

After the other evening editorial conference participants have left, the *Daily's* senior editor carries out the policy decisions and, when developments so require, changes policy. A senior editor and an assistant editor work from 1200 to 2200. Another senior editor and two assistant editors arrive at 2100 to take the overnight tour. Cable editors are on duty from 1000 to 0130. Seven analysts remain on night duty.

In late afternoon, publication typists begin recording drafts on tape for the phototypesetting machine. The machinery clacks and buzzes through the night as the production staff catches up with the day's editorial output and keeps abreast of the revisions, updates, and new items that the night representatives contribute. The Operations Center keeps the traffic flowing, and the Senior Night Duty Officer alerts the editors and night representatives to significant developments. Printers, meanwhile, make screened prints of photographs and merge map plates into camera-ready form. The substance of national intelligence comes forth as texts and illustrations on dozens of pieces of paper.

The next task: to give form to substance, to integrate dozens of pieces of paper into a tightly organized whole. It is, says an editor, like having to write a sonnet.

By midnight, the editors know which articles are contending for publication, approximately how long the articles are, and what priorities the articles have. They know, too, the nature and size of the available illustrations. They have estimates of the significance and length of some articles still under preparation. They do not know what might happen at 0400 to change things. Still, they must proceed, and within a rigid deadline structure maintain some measure of flexibility to cope with what might happen at 0400. One of the assistant editors, a specialist in such work, designs the page layout—pages 2 and 3 first, pages 1 and 4 last.

The designer sketches a dummy showing where each article should go and the size of the headline it should have. As the layout man begins pasting the articles into place, the editors write the headlines to size. The headlines, produced on the phototypesetting machine, then are pasted into the openings the layout man has left for them. When articles do not fit, knives flash and bottom sentences fall. Shortly before 0300, the page 2-3 layout goes to the Special Printing Plant. There, the printers photograph it, make a press plate, and start the run on the Miehle press.

With pages 2 and 3 coming off the press, layout work proceeds on pages 1 and 4. These pages can stay open for revisions and additions until after 0430. Then the page 1-4 layout goes to the Special Printing Plant. The printers make the page 1-4 press plate, flip over the completed page 2-3 stack, and start printing page 1-4 on the other side. As the newspapers come off the press in flat sheets at 0600, the printers fold them. Registry Branch couriers slip the newspapers into jackets, and then into envelopes and

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briefcases, for delivery. The “whisch-whisch” of the Miehle press has barely subsided before the couriers’ cars head down the George Washington Parkway.

Another *Daily*—7,000 words of national intelligence incorporating the broad and the deep with the latest—is on the way to the policy makers. Copy No. 1 goes to President Ford, who continued his subscription when he moved to the White House.



## INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

BODYGUARD OF LIES. By *Anthony Cave Brown*. (Harper & Row, New York, 1975. 947 pp.)

The rather improbable title of this book—an outstanding example of what might perhaps best be described as scholarly investigative journalism applied to the field of oral<sup>1</sup> military history—finds its origins in the following Churchill quotation:

“In war-time, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.”

While ostensibly a narrative description of the role of “Bodyguard,” the Anglo-American deception effort in support of military operations against Hitler in World War II, it is also a litany of compelling illustrations of the application of intelligence (both human and military) and special operations in the winning of the war in the West. Perhaps its greatest virtue is that it is the first detailed open-literature presentation of an integrated view of both the political and military aspects of warfare as expressed in deception and, specifically, of the contributions made by “special means” to the achievement of strategic and tactical surprise before, during and after the Normandy invasion.

Written largely from a British viewpoint, the book presents warfare as a vast game of ploy and counterploy engaged in by small groups of high-level planners and executives, men of great sensitivity and intelligence, who were striving to optimize the effectiveness of limited resources (the British), while cooperating with a massive and dynamic ally (the Americans), the latter impatient to get the job done as expeditiously as possible and with only limited regard for the niceties of how or at what cost.

It is the story of a vast, interlocking conspiracy between the British, the Americans and, during the invasion period itself, even the Russians, to deceive Hitler and the German military leadership as to the time, place, and manner in which the invasion of western Europe would take place. (For reasons of security, the French were forced to play the role of silent partner, something for which de Gaulle was never to forgive either Britain or America.) The centerpiece of this effort was the attempt to dupe Hitler into believing that the main Allied effort would be made against the Pas de Calais of France, and to sustain this belief even after the real attack had been launched against Normandy. The remarkable success of this monumental deception is well known. What the author has done for us here, in a very accomplished manner, is to present the major elements of the story in both human and institutional terms.

A mere review cannot begin to do justice to the richness of example afforded by this detailed compendium of descriptions of organizations, plans, operations, incidents

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<sup>1</sup>Although Cave Brown made extensive use of published material and some limited use of official records, his heavy reliance on personal interviews in support of key elements of his presentation is felt to justify the reviewer's use of the term “oral history” in describing this work.

and personalities. Whether it concerns the sacrifices and failures resulting from the need to preserve the security of the source of Ultra<sup>2</sup> data, as in the decision not to warn the town of Coventry that it was to be bombed, or the initial defeat of the British 8th Army in North Africa because its then commanding general could not be told that the intelligence concerning Rommel's impending attack was absolutely accurate, or the many deceptions, stratagems, and special operations mounted in support of Bodyguard and its subordinate elements, the book abounds in fascinating and seemingly authoritative descriptions of events and situations. A multitude of errors of detail arise from the author's need to rely on secondary sources, personal interviews with participants in events long after the fact, and only limited access to official records (even that only after the majority of his writing had been completed). It would appear, however, that the main outlines of the story have been accurately preserved.

There are numerous neat little examples of the use of Ultra intelligence to defeat the enemy on the field of battle, as in the case of Montgomery's victory at El Alamein, and in the winning of the Battle of the Atlantic through destruction of the U-boat resupply system and—eventually—the U-boats themselves. Then there were the vital contributions of Ultra to air warfare in the winning of the Battle of Britain, and in permitting the British to mount such an effective (if vain) defense of Crete against the German paratroop and glider forces that Hitler lost faith in airborne warfare and used these specially trained troops as infantry in future operations. All of this is presented in engrossing detail.

Much attention is given to critical tactical aspects of the Normandy invasion through the breakout phase and into the early stages of the battle for northern France. The use of Ultra intelligence to determine German plans and movements as a basis for the application of both conventional and unconventional means in the isolation of the battlefield is set forth in great detail. Always in the background is the necessity to maintain the credibility of the threat to attack the Pas de Calais, so that the German 15th Army would continue to be held in reserve in that area and would, as a consequence, not figure in the Normandy operations. The use of XX-Committee<sup>3</sup> double agents contributed importantly to this deception. Hundreds of special forces teams were employed at strategic points around the periphery of the battle area, either to act on their own or to guide the actions of local resistance elements in harassing and delaying German infantry and armored forces trying to reach Normandy from Brittany and from south-central France.

The futile efforts of the Schwarze Kapelle,<sup>4</sup> the abortive high-level German resistance movement against Hitler that functioned throughout the war and received significant support from Admiral Canaris' Abwehr (military counterintelligence), is treated in considerable detail, particularly in relationship to Anglo-American planning. While the conspiracy purportedly provided some important intelligence inputs and unwittingly served the British as a cover for Ultra in some instances, no evidence is presented that this conspiracy was taken seriously and exploited in a major positive fashion by the deception planners. The author is clearly of the opinion that opportunities were lost in the non-utilization of the Schwarze Kapelle. British sources

<sup>2</sup>The British security codeword used to designate compartmented signals intelligence.

<sup>3</sup>The coordinating body, supported by M1-5, responsible for organizing the employment of a select group of "doubled" German agents in deception operations (see J. C. Masterman, *The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939-1945*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1972.)

<sup>4</sup>The term of opprobrium reportedly used by Reinhard Heydrich, head of the intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the SS, to designate the file on the German officer conspiracy (see Walter Schellenberg, *The Schellenberg Memoirs*, Deutsch, London, 1956.)

have subsequently claimed that the role of the Schwarze Kapelle in Anglo-American deception activities has been greatly exaggerated.<sup>5</sup>

A most interesting and significant example of the effects of deception (and of self-deception) presented by the author concerns Col. von Roenne, the able head of Fremde Heere West (FHW), the Wehrmacht intelligence agency responsible for appreciations of Allied threats to the German forces in western Europe. This officer who, incidentally, was also a member of the Schwarze Kapelle, was the western front counterpart to General Gehlen in the East. Since he was responsible for military estimates relative to the anticipated invasion of France, his office became one of the main targets of Bodyguard's deception operations. The Allies were able to deceive him into overestimating their forces in England through a variety of stratagems involving leaks and double-agent disinformation actions, supported by Ultra intercepts that permitted monitoring and estimation of the effects of their efforts.

Thus, after the Sicherheitsdienst (the SD or secret intelligence service of the SS) had become dominant over German military intelligence early in 1944, Col. von Roenne learned that they were halving his estimates of Allied forces in England before passing them on to higher headquarters. On the advice of his assistant, who the author suggests may actually have been a British agent, Col. von Roenne was supposedly persuaded with reluctance to double his estimates of these forces. When the SD subsequently ceased their editing of his figures, the overestimation of Allied strength became very greatly magnified, thereby providing support to the London Controlling Section's mythical scenarios of large forces being held in readiness in northern and southeastern England. If true, this must have contributed in no small measure to the successful deception of Hitler which resulted in retention of the 15th Army in the Pas de Calais area long after the attack on Normandy.<sup>6</sup>

The general cover and deception plan for Overlord<sup>7</sup> was originally called Plan Jael and, subsequently, simply Bodyguard. Bodyguard would attempt to persuade the German leadership to believe the following six strategic considerations: (1) The Allies had so much faith in the decisive character of the combined bombing and would give it such high priority that the buildup of ground forces would be too slow to permit an invasion until July of 1944, if one were intended at all that year; (2) German forces had to be held where they were in western Europe because there were troops ready in

<sup>5</sup> H.R. Trevor-Roper, the distinguished Oxford historian and a WW II member of MI-6, in a quite biased and highly unfavorable review of this book (See *New York Review of Books*, 19 February 1976), asserts that Stewart Menzies, WW II head of MI-6, from whom Cave Brown obtained important aspects of the Schwarze Kapelle and MI-6 portions of the book, was by the time of the interview senile and eager for self-aggrandizement. Trevor-Roper's own objectivity is open to question when he claims that Cave Brown has made MI-6 the controlling element of British deception efforts in which the role of the Schwarze Kapelle has been grossly inflated. This is an exaggerated interpretation of admittedly erroneous tendencies on the part of the author, through which Trevor-Roper attempts to show that the book contains fundamental misperceptions, but Trevor-Roper's credentials as a participant in some of the events under consideration cannot be ignored when it comes to matters of factual detail. He points out many such errors, strengthening this reviewer's impression that this is the book's basic failing, arising out of the author's limited access to primary source material, his lack of background in the area of intelligence, and his journalistic compulsion to present a readable story, however fragmentary the available data.

<sup>6</sup> There is evidence that this fascinating story may have been considerably exaggerated. Gert Buchheit, in *Spionage in Zwei Weltkriegen* (Verlag Politisches Archiv, Landshut, Bundesrepublik, 1975,) criticizes the much less explicit treatment of von Roenne by Ladislav Farago (*Game of the Foxes*, David McKay Co., Inc., New York, 1971.) Specifically, Buchheit disputes the central role of Col. von Roenne in intelligence estimating, noting that he was located in OKH (Army HQ,) while the estimates of enemy capabilities which carried weight with German policy makers were being provided by OKW (Armed Forces HQ.)

<sup>7</sup> The overall Allied plan for the invasion of western Europe.

England to take advantage of any weakening of German garrisons; (3) there would be a joint Anglo-American-Russian attack on various parts of Norway in the spring of 1944; (4) the main Allied effort in the spring of 1944 would be against the Balkans; (5) the Russians would not begin their summer offensive before the end of June; and (6) the requisite Allied force for a cross-Channel assault would not be trained and ready until the summer—in any event, the western powers would not launch their offensive until after the Russians had opened their main summer offensive.

The broad strategic deceptions of Bodyguard included some 36 subordinate plans and scores of associated stratagems. Elaborate deceptions were involved, which were designed to threaten Norway, the Pas de Calais, and the Biscay and Mediterranean coasts of France, their object being—in conjunction with continuing threats to the Balkans and the existing military operations in Italy—to tie down German forces in those areas before, during, and after Neptune.<sup>8</sup> In addition to these stratagems, Bodyguard proposed to mount a large diplomatic and political offensive to induce, or at least suggest, the possibility of defection of Finland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. A similar campaign, which would also include economic warfare, would be launched to persuade the neutrals—Sweden, Turkey, Portugal, and Spain—to enter the conflict on the Allied side, or to compel them to cut their links with Germany. And, finally, a massive campaign of political warfare would be directed at the occupied countries and at the Third Reich itself.<sup>9</sup>

While Bodyguard became the formal responsibility of General Eisenhower, its operational coordination rested with a small group of British establishment personalities (with one American representative) known as the London Controlling Section (LCS) within Allied Supreme Headquarters. Many members of this group saw themselves as representing the last vestiges of British tradition. As a consequence, they had little difficulty in convincing themselves that they were fully justified in waiving the rules in this life-or-death struggle with the Hun. This group, operating at the highest levels of security, and with full access to Ultra intelligence, exercised general guidance and coordination of the various Committees of Special Means (CSM) located within the major war planning staffs of the Allied forces. The element within the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington was known as Joint Security Control (JSC). While Cave Brown does not make the point with clarity, the CSMs were directly responsible for the planning and control of deception operations within their own commands.

LCS had "A-Force" in the Mediterranean, and similar bureaus in the Near East, India, and Southeast Asia through which to exercise its influence on military operations. The contributions of the Soviet government to Bodyguard and Fortitude<sup>10</sup> would be arranged by the British and American military missions in Moscow. (A formal protocol between the Allies and the Russians, to cover cooperation during the invasion period, was signed at the beginning of March, 1944, and was ended by the Russians six months later.) When their services were required, all MI-6, SOE, and OSS agents in the field were available to the LCS, as were the deception sections in the Allied army groups, the various British and American economic and political warfare agencies, the British Foreign Office, and the American State Department. The

<sup>8</sup> The sub-element of Overlord concerned with the invasion of Normandy.

<sup>9</sup> It should be pointed out that only a limited number of the deceptions envisaged in the early planning were implemented, a fact which Cave Brown fails to make clear. He was obviously led astray to a certain extent by overreliance on early planning documents.

<sup>10</sup> Fortitude was the overall project for deceptions aimed at convincing the Germans that notional Allied forces in the UK were poised to land at points other than Normandy.

controlled double agents of the XX-Committee were to play an important role in support of the effort, as well. In the words of the author, "deception had become a major industry."

While specific examples of particular controversial aspects of this book will be discussed below, it seems worthwhile to bring up at this point a general criticism of the book's implied theme that the LCS served as the coordinator of all Allied deception operations. While it probably maintained cognizance of all such operations in order to avoid duplications of effort, inadvertent disclosures of policy, etc., it certainly did not possess the capability for conceiving, planning, and executing the myriads of stratagems and deceptions that came into being in support of Allied efforts. Even in the military field, it had to relinquish responsibility to the field commands for the generation of local deception activity.

That LCS concerned itself with the deception planning in support of Overlord cannot be disputed. Another organization which preceded it into existence by several years, however, was responsible for many high-level stratagems and deceptions in both the political and military realms. This was the British Security Coordination (BSC) under Sir William Stephenson, which reported directly to Winston Churchill.<sup>11</sup> Conceived as a coordinating body for all British intelligence, counterintelligence, and special operations in the days when the very survival of Britain was open to serious question, this operation was set up in New York City in 1940.

It subsequently expanded to encompass a staff of some 2000 individuals (1,000 of them in New York City), with a major communications center and extensive facilities in Ontario, Canada, for the training of operational personnel and the development and manufacture of special equipment. It was provided with full access to Ultra intelligence and, through Stephenson, served as a key link between Churchill and Roosevelt in the uncertain days prior to U.S. entrance into the war against the Axis.

An important early function of BSC was to provide the American president with detailed information on Fascist activities directed against the United States, which served to justify his approval of unofficial U.S. cooperation with Britain against Germany. Moreover, once the United States was involved in the war, such intelligence helped to assure that a major share of the U.S. military effort was directed toward Europe. Among the most important contributions of BSC during this early period were its efforts in support of the creation of the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI),<sup>12</sup> with William Donovan as its head.

Although the role of BSC as an intelligence coordinating body diminished after Pearl Harbor, as the position of Britain became less precarious and that nation became transformed into a mammoth staging area for an eventual return to the European mainland, the organization continued to perform important intelligence functions, particularly with respect to the security of the Western Hemisphere. Through the scant attention which he gives to British Security Coordination in his massive tome, *Cave Brown* reveals his ignorance of large areas of WW II intelligence history, and of the scope of British intelligence activities in particular. He mentions BSC only once, and then incorrectly, as the MI-6 organization in New York City.

There are many positive features of this ambitious work, aside from the above criticism and the many minor errors of detail inevitable in a creative work of this size

<sup>11</sup>William Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1976.)

<sup>12</sup>The first U.S. central intelligence activity, which preceded and gave birth to the Office of Strategic Services. See Thomas F. Troy, "The COI and British Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence XVIII-1-Supplement*.

(i.e., dates, titles of offices, descriptions of events, translations of German terms, etc.), based so heavily on secondary references and the oral testimony of individuals long after the events in question—to say nothing of the limitations imposed by security. A number of debatable or controversial matters, however, should be mentioned.

For one thing, the extent of the responsibility of Ultra, deception, and special means for the success of the Normandy invasion is open to at least some question on general principles. The author himself attributes much of the element of tactical surprise to the relaxation of German vigilance because of the unfavorable weather immediately prior to and during the early portion of the invasion. Moreover, intelligence and surprise are generally conceded by military authorities to constitute only a moderate portion of the prerequisites for success in battle, despite the fact that they can be decisive in some cases, as the author would have us believe was true in this instance. While there is little doubt that losses would have been much greater and success would probably have been delayed had there been no Bodyguard, to call it decisive may be journalistic exaggeration.

The tendency of the author to use the terms Ultra and Magic interchangeably is regarded as an oversimplification by American code-breaking specialists. The author tends to excuse use of the term by Bodyguard personnel as a means of cover for the Ultra effort, certainly an understandable justification. Thus, prior to the Anglo-American intelligence collaboration in 1941, the American Magic code-breaking effort against the Japanese had proceeded along quite different lines, largely independent of the British Ultra activity. This was despite the common origins of German and Japanese encoding equipment in early forms of Enigma which were commercially available in Europe in the 1920s. While Cave Brown fails to note the close collaboration between the two efforts that was initiated prior to Pearl Harbor,<sup>13</sup> he does pay tribute to American contributions to Bodyguard through signals intercept activity against the Japanese at Asmara, Ethiopia. There, the radio-teleprinter communications of the Japanese ambassador to Germany were being read regularly to reveal high-level German military and political planning information. Presumably, Magic was involved here, rather than Ultra.

The occasional air of condescension about the author's descriptions of the British origins of deception thinking and direction, and the supposed general deterioration of deception efforts when Eisenhower took over the Allied command after the Normandy invasion, is somewhat annoying.<sup>14</sup> One receives the distinct impression that the author feels there would have been no coordinated deception activity had the British—and Churchill in particular—not created the magnificent Bodyguard instrument. While perhaps true in terms of the overall concept, tactical deception would certainly have been included in Allied military planning whether or not LCS had ever existed. Debate on this point is bound to be inconclusive and is probably pointless. It would seem to be more a question of degree than of the likelihood of existence or non-existence of deception and special means, had Churchill not introduced the idea.

The author's claim that Cicero,<sup>15</sup> the valet of the British ambassador to Turkey who delivered many of that gentleman's secret papers to the Germans, was actually under the control of MI-6 as a deception operation, seems implausible, although there are other indications that this may have been true toward the end of Cicero's tenure. Thus, despite the reported assertion of the former head of MI-6, Stewart Menzies, to

<sup>13</sup>Stevenson, *op. cit.*

<sup>14</sup>For one thing, deception's greatest role is played prior to the battle.

<sup>15</sup>The code-name assigned to this spy by German intelligence.

the author, that Cicero had been under British control, and certain circumstantial evidence which the author adduces in support of the claim, it defies imagination to believe that Overlord planning documents would have been unilaterally leaked to the Germans by the British simply to convince the former of the overwhelming strength of the Allies in preparation for the invasion. The fortuitous circumstance that the German secret services (the SD in this case) did not believe the information and made no use of it could certainly not have been foreseen by LCS.<sup>16</sup> The inherent self-serving character of this story is so apparent that it requires much more proof than Cave Brown advances to justify its acceptance.

The author's story of the British acquisition of an Enigma machine from Poland is certainly open to question. However, given that there are at least six supposedly authoritative versions of this controversial issue, it scarcely seems profitable to argue the pros and cons of any particular one. The true story will have to await some official history of the events concerned. The main points of difference among the various versions concern the role of French intelligence in bringing the British and Polish intelligence forces together in 1939 to exploit Polish access to an Enigma device. Thus, despite the claims presented by the French intelligence officer, General Bertrand, in his book *Enigma*,<sup>17</sup> to the effect that he brought the British and Polish code-breakers together, there is recent evidence<sup>18</sup> that the British may have been in secret contact with the Poles with respect to Enigma as early as 1938. There is general agreement, however, that the British did not bring a model of the Enigma machine back from Poland until mid-1939.

One mystery in Cave Brown's version is his apparent acceptance of Bertrand's book and his use of it in support of many arguments and discussions related to code-breaking, while at the same time he ignores the description Bertrand gives of the French acquisition of Enigma. Instead Cave Brown seems to favor the version advanced by the former French intelligence officer Garder, which is presented in the appendix of Bertrand's book but repudiated by Bertrand as completely false. To compound the mystery, Cave Brown chooses to support his approach by quoting an issue of *Die Nachhut* (The Rear Guard), the publication of former members of the Abwehr, which also favors the Garder version. As neither story now seems likely to be accepted by historians as the true one, the matter has become somewhat academic. Cave Brown does, however, reveal a considerable measure of confusion on this subject.

The author is on somewhat less controversial ground when he claims that Enigma-derived information was not shared with the Russians. At least three sources<sup>19</sup> maintain, however—albeit without any supporting evidence—that such information was indeed made available to the Russians without letting them know the actual source, using Roessler (i.e., "Lucy"), of Buero Ha<sup>20</sup> in Switzerland as a cut-out to Rado, the chief Soviet intelligence agent in Switzerland, whose main radio operator was the possible British double agent, Alexander Foote. The chief question here seems to be whether Buero Ha, an adjunct of the Swiss military intelligence organization

<sup>16</sup>Gert Buchheit, *op. cit.*

<sup>17</sup>Gustav Bertrand, *Enigma* (Librairie Plon, Paris, 1973).

<sup>18</sup>Stevenson, *op. cit.*

<sup>19</sup>Richard Deacon, *A History of the British Secret Service* (Frederick Mueller, London, 1969;); Malcolm Muggeridge, *The Infernal Grove* (William Morrow, New York, 1974;); and Charles Whiting, *The Battle for Twelveland* (Lec Cooper, London, 1975.)

<sup>20</sup>Roessler, code-named Lucy, provided information which purported to come from the highest German government circles to the Soviet Resident, Rado, through one of Rado's subordinate agents. It is suspected that Roessler actually received the information from the organization of Major Hausmann of Swiss intelligence known as Buero Ha, for which Roessler worked. (c.f. Whiting, *op. cit.*)

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with a semi-official pre-war status, was the real source of Roessler's information and, if so, whether Buero Ha obtained its information from Germany or from the British. To date, this remains an open question.

The great detail presented on the so-called Schwarze Kapelle suggests a heavy reliance on German source material. Comments on the misuse of German dissidents and the loss of opportunities to avert the need of an invasion of Europe also have a somewhat German flavor. The author leaves us with the feeling that the British never took the German dissident movement seriously and, lacking any real understanding or trust of it, used it without compunction as a cover for the source for Ultra material and for other deception purposes. Whether any useful information was obtained from the Schwarze Kapelle is left an open question. A more recent book<sup>21</sup> confirms that the British never really trusted Admiral Canaris and his associates and that it was left to the Americans, working through the OSS in Switzerland, to exploit this doubtful source.

The tone of condescension of the book toward the American war leadership is perhaps inevitable in a work so dependent on British sources. For example, attribution of the concept of "Unconditional Surrender" to an off-hand statement by President Roosevelt when he could not think of anything better to say is open to serious question. According to most accounts, Henry Morgenthau is supposed to have had something to do with originating this uncompromising policy. The impression that the Americans were lacking in sophistication in the matter of deception comes through frequently, as does the low opinion of the capacities of Generals Marshall and Eisenhower held by the British military leadership. Actually, the tone of the book with regard to U.S. lack of sophistication is mild in comparison with that of the history of British Security Coordination mentioned earlier.<sup>22</sup> Near the end of his presentation, Cave Brown tries to balance the story on Marshall in the matter of the cross-Channel invasion controversy by noting the existence of German contingency plans to withdraw from France in 1943, observing that Marshall may have been right after all to press for an early invasion of France over British opposition. Other more official histories of the British point of view during that period remain uncompromising in their opposition to an invasion of western Europe in 1943.<sup>23</sup> Another bone of contention arising out of different British and American strategic perceptions which comes in for frequent comment is the special interest of the British in the eastern end of the Mediterranean and Churchill's desire for an attack on the Balkans.

The sources of German tactical surprise in May 1940 and December 1944 come in for considerable discussion. It is suggested that the Ultra capability was not fully operable in the first case and that over-reliance was placed on it in the second case. It is also suggested that the Germans may have become aware of the compromise of Enigma before the Battle of the Bulge, thereby accounting for the employment of radio silence by the German commander, Marshal von Rundstedt, during the period prior to the attack. The author advances the view that a trusted member of the Dutch underground and purported confidant of Prince Bernhard, operating under the code name King Kong, had been doubled by the Germans and revealed the secret of Ultra to them. No explanation of the highly improbable access of either Prince Bernhard or King Kong to Ultra intelligence is offered by Cave Brown.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Stevenson, *op. cit.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Indeed, Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, has recently repudiated this story and threatened to sue the author.

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Whether von Rundstedt simply chose to maintain radio silence to further the deception he was pursuing as to the number of divisions facing the Americans in eastern Belgium, or whether he suspected the truth, is, of course, open to debate. Certainly, the Germans went back to the use of Enigma after the beginning of the Bulge action. Flicke<sup>25</sup> offers as an explanation for the German ability to achieve surprise the lack of German-speaking American agents behind the German lines during a transition period in combat. This reported lack of rear-area radio traffic is consistent with the claim made in the official OSS history<sup>26</sup> that at the time of the Battle of the Bulge, the First Army (U.S.) was the only army without an OSS field detachment. Flicke, a former lieutenant-colonel in the Funkabwehr (signal security service,) notes the absence of agent broadcasts from within the German lines after October 1944, as the Allied forces in northern France left French-speaking areas behind in their advance to the borders of Germany. He gives no hint of any German suspicion that Enigma had been compromised, and he certainly should have been in a position to know such information. The author offers the explanation that even if it had been suspected that Enigma was no longer safe, it would not have been feasible—given the disrupted state of German signal communications after Normandy—to have made a fundamental change in encipherment techniques. On the face of it, this is a rather facile and unconvincing argument.

In view of the many evidences of inconsistency, controversy, and simple errors of fact in this book, of which only a few have been cited here, it seems appropriate to inquire into the author's sources of information. For one thing, given official British reluctance to cooperate with the author, to what extent are the interviews with British sources entitled to belief? Has the author deliberately withheld material at official request and, if so, to what extent is the accuracy of the presentation affected thereby? Thus, the author admits that the text was nearly complete before he gained access to declassified U.S. information. The majority of the writing must, therefore, have been based on oral interviews with individuals concerning events far in the past and on a study of secondary references, mainly in the form of openly published intelligence literature, a notoriously unreliable source of information. How objective was the author able to be when it came down to a decision between U.S. and British views of a particular issue? Was the author's discovery that people opened up to him more, the more he seemed to know about a subject, really evidence of openness on the part of respondents, or was the author being used by some of those being interviewed, particularly those with a British or German orientation? Only a detailed analysis of source material can provide answers to questions such as these.

A number of general points arise after reading this extensive work on the role of deception and special means in warfare, some of which may even be catalogued under the designation of "lessons learned." The first and most obvious of these is what the book's revelations do to the credibility of histories of WW II prepared with access to the conventional source material only, such as press accounts and memoirs. While it does little to the chronicle of events, it plays havoc with the validity of analytical appraisals of cause and effect, particularly, appreciations of the reasons for the outcomes of battles. We are in the position of the historians who have, over the decades, commented glowingly on the inherent superiority of the German army at Tannenberg at the outset of WW I, when in fact the Germans had been listening to Russian radio traffic broadcast in the clear, and knew all of the latter's order of battle

<sup>25</sup>William F. Flicke, *War Secrets in the Ether*, NSA 1953-1954 (OUO.)

<sup>26</sup>*War Report—Office of Strategic Services (OSS)*, Vol. 2, Washington, D.C., 1949 (Declassified.)

and planning secrets (a situation which, incidentally, did not change materially when the Russians subsequently introduced a primitive system of encipherment).<sup>27</sup>

Another question is, of course, why, having all of this detailed knowledge of German order of battle and planning through Ultra and other sources, the Allies did not do a better job of beating the Germans. While the text presents numerous examples as to why, the question really goes to the basic contribution of intelligence to success in battle and the qualifications of the Germans as military opponents. As to the first question, the limited possibilities of intelligence to control most tactical situations should be apparent to anyone with military staff experience. As to the second, it cannot be denied that the Germans had built a formidable military machine with a highly competent leadership group in the form of the German General Staff and the many talented field commanders. The author brings out the latter point very well in his treatment of Rommel's masterful generalship in North Africa and his futile improvisations during the Normandy campaign.

Clearly in the category of lessons to be learned is the superiority of a centrally coordinated intelligence, security, and special operations activity, as represented by the LCS and Bodyguard, over uncoordinated, largely independent, and competing agencies, as represented by the German political and military intelligence services.

The main lesson of Enigma itself is never to place reliance on any device or procedure that is not subject to periodic objective testing. Unfortunately, it is a weakness of systems protected by extremes of security that they tend to be insulated from adequate review by their very security procedures. On the other hand, Anglo-American experience with Ultra shows that, given the proper incentives, mechanisms, and, above all, choice of personnel, security can be maintained over very long periods of time spanning both war and peace.

Were it not for the crucial nature of the failure of the *Schwarze Kapelle*, it would scarcely be worthwhile to rehearse the much studied conspiracy of the generals, and of Admiral Canaris in particular. The latter would seem to typify the paradox of the anti-Nazi German nationalist, a patriot who desperately wished to see the downfall of Hitler, but who could not bring himself to violate his soldier's oath and engage in openly treasonable action until it was too late. It is little wonder that the British intelligence agencies did not know what to make of Canaris and his associates. In any event, it was no way to run a successful palace revolution. Proud men of action found themselves enmeshed in the futility of indecision, while the SD slowly but surely closed in on them.

Perhaps the greatest lesson to be learned from this study in strategic order of battle deception concerns the validity of the traditional process of intelligence analysis in which a picture of enemy "capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action" (the last being a cautious euphemism for intentions) is assembled from bits and pieces of information of varying degrees of reliability. The British scheme was clearly to defeat this process by systematically creating a false picture of the Allied order of battle and operational plans (particularly the time and place of the main invasion effort) through the leakage of slightly false items of information on major matters, information carefully calculated to confirm what the German leadership was predisposed to believe (i.e., a Pas de Calais invasion site), and gross distortions of those things which the Germans could not readily confirm (the dispositions, strength, and state of training of invasion forces in England). Through the medium of Ultra

<sup>27</sup> Muggerridge, *op. cit.*

intelligence, the effects of this deception could be tracked, permitting the employment of special means to repair any weaknesses that might develop in the false picture which was being created.

An interesting side-observation arising out of this study of deception is the ease with which senior commanders were convinced of a false pattern of developments, despite the many doubts of working-level personnel of the German intelligence services concerning the validity of particular elements of deception. Thus, once the predispositions of the opposing military leaders were understood, particularly those of Hitler himself, deception could be focused on the reinforcement of those preconceptions. Considerable latitude in erroneous detail could be tolerated once a general pattern of development had been established, without changing German leadership perceptions. Buchheit's observations on the degree of knowledge possessed by German military intelligence prior to the Normandy invasion are instructive in this regard.<sup>28</sup>

Likewise, many deceptions which seemed quite promising in the planning stages actually had little effect in practice. An example of this is the celebrated operation known popularly as "The Man Who Never Was," in which a corpse dressed in the uniform of a British major and carrying false secret dispatches, was allowed to float ashore on the coast of Spain.<sup>29</sup> It was intended that the papers should find their way to German intelligence and indicate to them the false intent of attacks against Sardinia and Greece instead of against Sicily. According to a former German staff officer<sup>30</sup> this deception, despite its acceptance by the Germans, in reality had no significant influence on the subsequent course of events. The threat of attacks on Sardinia and on Greece had already been accepted by the German leadership many months before, perhaps due to earlier deception efforts, and appropriate dispositions of troops had been made. Likewise, several dozen intercepted messages originating from North Africa clearly indicated that Sicily was a likely point of attack. Hence, the Axis forces had prepared themselves to a certain extent against all eventualities.

Although one may argue that the success of the main Bodyguard deception depended primarily on the failure of German intelligence collection capabilities within Britain and on the increasingly disrupted character of the German military services prior to the invasion of France, the Bodyguard story also points up the absolute necessity for confirmatory evidence in support of the results of analysis of fragmentary information. Thus, the much-touted "mosaic" approach to the analysis of intelligence is highly susceptible to the influences of erroneous data, whether arising from natural causes or from deliberate action on the part of the opposition. From the standpoint of intelligence analysis and its pitfalls, alone, *Bodyguard of Lies* should be regarded as a basic text and required reading for all aspiring intelligence analysts.

One incidental result of publication of the revelations of Bodyguard should be to answer certain nagging questions in the minds of those still surviving German generals and admirals as to why, despite all their efforts, the "breaks" always seemed to go against them in crucial situations, in seeming defiance of all the laws of probability. Were it not for the still unforgettable Hitlerian overtones, one might even manage to feel a bit sorry for the "honest gentlemen" of the German military officer corps, who

<sup>28</sup> Buchheit, *op. cit.*

<sup>29</sup> As set forth in the book of the same name by the originator of the scheme, Ewen Montagu (Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1953, 1966.) Montagu has stated privately that in two pages dealing with this operation, Cave Brown has "ten factual errors and three embellishments."

<sup>30</sup> Buchheit, *op. cit.*

were up against another group of "honest gentlemen" who had elected to waive the rules of gentlemanly behavior for the duration. In reality, of course, the Germans were not above using deception themselves whenever the opportunity presented itself, as witness the large-scale "North Pole" operation in Holland, when for more than a year the Abwehr, by means of false radio transmissions from doubled agents, captured a majority of the personnel being parachuted into Holland to work with the Dutch underground, and caused futile airdrops of many tons of materiel.<sup>31</sup>

Cave Brown, the author of this spectacular if flawed work, is a retired foreign correspondent for major British and Australian newspapers. He acquired an early interest in the subject of deception operations through observation of his father, an expert engraver, working on propaganda material and deceptive cartography for the government in war-time England. He says that he first began thinking seriously about this book when he was reporting from Washington during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the course of his research, he assembled great quantities of material derived from open literature, declassified U.S. official documents, and the results of more than a hundred interviews of former British, American, German, and French intelligence personnel who were in one way or another associated with deception operations.

Denied access to official British records in no uncertain terms, Cave Brown was more successful with the National Archives and the Office of Military History in Washington, profiting greatly from recent declassifications of records under the Freedom of Information Act. He reportedly still has more than 100,000 words of unused manuscript with which he expects to do more publishing. Given the multitude of errors of detail in the present work, there is probably little reason to fear prosecution for security violations. It would be quite difficult for any prosecutor to show that the author has told the absolute truth about any matter with which he has dealt.

The atomistic thinker or the academic interested in absolute historical accuracy would probably do well to avoid this book. It is not a reliable reference text on the minutiae of particular deception operations. However, the Gestalt thinker, who can be satisfied with holistic impressions of the patterns of military deception operations and who enjoys immersing himself in a highly readable presentation by a competent writer who has taken pains to make the most of uncertain data and a modest understanding of his subject matter, should find the book a rewarding experience.

While far superior in the scope of its coverage and much better written than counterpart publications such as Winterbotham's *The Ultra Secret*,<sup>32</sup> Bertrand's *Enigma*, Stevenson's *A Man Called Intrepid*, and Delmer's *The Counterfeit Spy*,<sup>33</sup> Cave Brown's work fails to escape the common stigma of intelligence narratives: considerable inaccuracy as to detail and occasional lack of validity of interpretation. It raises enough questions to suggest the need for an official history of the subject of deception and special means in WW II. Moreover, in addition to making such a treatment available for the European Theater, there is need of a better understanding of the role of Magic and U.S. deception operations in the winning of the war in the Pacific.

Russell J. Bowen

<sup>31</sup>The story of this considerable success of German military intelligence is presented in H. J. Giskes, *London Calling North Pole* (Kimber, London, 1953.)

<sup>32</sup>Frederick N. Winterbotham, *The Ultra Secret* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1974.)

<sup>33</sup>Sefton Delmer, *The Counterfeit Spy* (Harper & Row, New York, 1971.)

Books

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THE FIRST CASUALTY. By *Phillip Knightley*. (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York and London, 1975. 425 pp, notes, bibliography and index.)

A full generation before Churchill insisted that truth in wartime should be shielded by "a bodyguard of lies," Senator Hiram Johnson was asserting in 1917 that "the first casualty when war comes is truth."

The main thrust of Knightley's history of war reporting seems to be that from the Crimea in 1854 through Vietnam, war correspondents have been so censored, misled, or patriotic that they have never shown war to be horrible enough to be outlawed.

Along the way, he analyzes in great detail how:

- during the Civil War "Sensationalism and exaggeration, outright lies, puffery, slander, faked eyewitness accounts, and conjectures built on pure imagination cheapened much that passed in the North for news;"

- in World War I, the British by and large kept correspondents far from the front lines and prevented any criticism of the conduct of the war;

- in Ethiopia, correspondents confined to headquarters on either side knew nothing of what was really going on;

- in Spain, balance could be achieved only by pairing biased reporters on either side;

- in World War Two, correspondents were not only censored, committed to their own side in most cases, and cooperative with the censors in muting the horrors of war, but made no effort to circumvent censorship and tell the public when things went wrong.

- in Vietnam, correspondents were not censored, and in many cases were not only *not for* but strongly *against* the side they were covering. They were too caught up in combat news, however, to put their main emphasis on the horrors of war.

Before going into any further detail, it should be noted that Knightley's competence on the subject of both war correspondents and the horrors of war is qualified by the dust-jacket statement that "He has never heard a shot fired in anger, and hopes he never will."

Knightley has researched his book in depth, and he includes enough case histories to cut the ground from under some of his contentions listed above, but in regard to both censorship and propaganda—the two subjects which bring this book into the intelligence purview—he ignores important distinctions.

Firstly, no accredited war correspondent has any right to expect, let alone demand, that he be allowed in wartime to acquire and publish information *unknown* to the enemy which will aid the enemy. Where there is mismanagement, bumbling, or failure, and *it is already known to the enemy or of no use to the enemy*, however, censorship stands on shaky ground in pleading "home front morale" and "comfort to the enemy." If Knightley is aware of this distinction he never makes it.

Secondly, with regard to propaganda, the best role for the correspondent and that which best serves the truth is *objectivity*. Herbert Matthews admits that in Spain he

went overboard in his bias in favor of the side he covered—the Republicans. Similar advocacy journalism reached its peak in Southeast Asia with those correspondents who were working from the South Vietnamese side but were critical of everything the South Vietnamese undertook. In these two examples, there is one sharp difference: the pro-Republican correspondents in Spain wrote at length about atrocities perpetrated by the opposing Franco side, but ignored those on their own side; in Vietnam there was quick, lurid, and widespread reporting of alleged South Vietnamese atrocities, but very little about those committed by the Communist forces.

In dealing with the first point—excessive censorship—Knightley on occasion saws off his own limb. He notes that William Howard Russell of the London *Times*, reporting from the Crimean War, described the catastrophic “Charge of the Light Brigade” graphically and accurately. Press dispatches from the Crimea were also responsible for the work of Florence Nightingale and the first efforts to provide nursing services for the wounded.

In World War One, as early as August 20, British correspondents who presumably had no access to the front lines nevertheless managed to report the British defeat at Mons. Press reporting on the fighting at Gallipoli cost the Commanding General his job.

In World War Two, Kasserine Pass and the Battle of the Bulge were accurately reported as American defeats. *Stars & Stripes*, over the anguished complaints of General Patton, came up with such “dogface” stories as the interception of the shoe-pacs and jump boots which could have been used at the front in Southern France by the quartermaster echelons of Peninsular Base Section back at the Mediterranean. Much of this, Knightley either ignores or doesn’t know about.

He notes, quite correctly: “Correspondents were not allowed in the theatre of war unless they were accredited, and one of the conditions of accreditation was that the correspondent must sign an agreement to submit all his copy to military or naval censorship.” And that, Knightley thinks, was that. He goes into some detail about the men who evaded censorship, smuggled the news home, or wrote books or magazine articles or lectured when they were no longer accredited and subject to censorship. But one of the few instances he cites where a reporter supposedly went to the mat with the censors is a freak case: my own eyewitness report of the *Queen Mary*’s collision with an antiaircraft cruiser, *HMS Curacoa* on Oct. 2, 1942. The *Curacoa*, which we would now call an AA-frigate at best, was a type the Royal Navy desperately needed for the Murmansk and Malta convoys. There was no way the Germans could know she had been sunk. Hence, it was not in the Royal Navy’s interest to release the story.<sup>1</sup> A CI operation was mounted, in fact, against the five correspondents who had been on board the *Queen* to determine whether they were inclined to talk about the incident, and one was soon “slowboated” home. In my case, I had access to the Admiralty censors because I was subsequently assigned to the Home Fleet at Scapa Flow, so I wrote the collision story, left one copy with the Admiralty, and the other in the United Press London safe. I then forgot about the story until VE-Day, when the Admiralty censors promptly released it with nary a prod from me or the United Press. So much for my going to the mat with the censors.

<sup>1</sup> Conversely, the British realized that the *Queen Mary* could hardly limp into Glasgow with her prow curled like a sardine can without some word reaching the Germans, so they “carelessly” ordered the dockyard navvies to clean the only drydock in England which would accommodate QM. Several days later, QM plodded off around Northern Ireland to Boston in a slow but heavily guarded convoy while British destroyers scragged several U-boats waiting eagerly on the approaches to the Southampton dockyard.

There is a sequel to the release of the *Queen Mary* story which demonstrates the subtler forms of censorship. Deciding that the Admiralty now appeared to be of a mind to "tell all," I dug back into my memory for a classified Royal Navy account I had read of the hunt for the *Bismarck*. On May 26, 1941, when the *Bismarck* was finally relocated south of England and making for the French coast, Admiral Somerville of "Force H" coming up from Gibraltar had detached the fast light cruiser *Sheffield* to close (staying just out of range of the *Bismarck's* guns) and shadow. Somehow, nobody informed the pilots of the Swordfish torpedo planes aboard *Ark Royal*, also in Force H.

The 14 Swordfish, searching for *Bismarck* by radar, found *Sheffield* instead some 20 miles to the north—weighing about 9,100 tons to *Bismarck's* 45,000. As any silhouette recognition expert will understand if he still remembers that WEFT meant "Wrong Every Fool Time," they promptly dove through the clouds to press home a determined but unopposed attack, and scored several hits before realizing their mistake.<sup>2</sup> Fortunately the torpedoes, according to the account I had read, were all armed with a new magnetic "pistol," or detonator, and failed to detonate properly, so no harm was done. Three hours later, a second attack by Swordfish found the proper target, and disabled *Bismarck's* steering action in the key encounter of the entire chase. By this time, "The failure of the magnetic torpedo pistols caused them to be replaced by contact pistols,"<sup>3</sup> and *Bismarck* was brought to bay.

Back in New York on leave in June, 1945, I wrote the story and turned it in with an explanation of how I had come by it. Harrison E. Salisbury, then heading the UP Cable Desk, was concerned that it might still be subject to censorship—the war still being on in the Pacific—and he sent it to Washington to be cleared with the British Naval Attaché. That worthy—whose name I never learned or I would pay him homage here for his one-upsmanship—knew he no longer had any censorship power, but replied to Salisbury: "There is no security objection but I've never head of this." Salisbury, grunting something about overreaching for stories, killed the report. Sir Winston Churchill's war histories<sup>4</sup> subsequently confirmed the Swordfish attack on *Sheffield*, but implied that all of the torpedoes had missed.

I can recall, on the other hand, flying with a B-24 squadron assigned to bomb Monte Cassino (the town, not the Abbey) which togglebombed instead on a similar village near Venafrò, five miles behind our own lines. I filed the story, the Fifteenth Air Force censors killed it, and UP headquarters in Naples appealed it to Theater Headquarters, which released the story some three days after the incident. The point is that when correspondents felt censors had overstepped the bounds, the press appealed, and the appeals in many cases worked. Criticism of the conduct of war *per se*, or of defeats, or of snafus, did *not* constitute valid grounds for censorship; of this Knightley seems to be unaware.

Postwar novels aside, the finest creative writing to emerge from combat is probably the expense account. There is Bob Casey's classic explanation of "\$50 miscellaneous" which auditors ordered him to itemize after an Alaskan assignment: "Replacement of lead sled dog, killed by wolves, \$49.50. Flowers for bereft bitch, \$0.50. I believe it was H. R. Knickerbocker who in Ethiopia accounted for several hundred dollars gone astray by dreaming up and describing a desert safari attacked by bandits, leaving Knickerbocker responsible for replacement of killed and stolen camels

<sup>2</sup>The aircraft then signalled the cruiser: "Sorry for the kippers."

<sup>3</sup>Roskill, Capt., S.W., RN, *The Navy at War, 1939-1945*, H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1954, p. 513.

<sup>4</sup>*The Grand Alliance, 1940-1941*.

and carts. Knightley's book charitably overlooks this particular brand of creativity, but concentrates effectively on the inventive correspondent and his phoney reporting for publication—particularly in the propaganda field.

*The First Casualty* documents at considerable length the contributions of correspondents to anti-German atrocity propaganda in World War One—the violated Belgian maidens, the Belgian babies with their hands cut off,<sup>5</sup> the German factories for converting bodies into glycerine—and to anti-Franco propaganda in Spain. The thrust of the account is that eager correspondents and newspapers probably did as much as the official propagandists, not only to circulate these stories, but to invent them. One correspondent, Claude Cockburn of the English *The Week*, scolded Louis Fischer, reporting for *The Nation*, for writing that in one action Republican troops were demoralized and bewildered. When Fischer protested that the readers had a right to the truth, Cockburn exploded: "Who gave [the readers] such a right? Perhaps when they have exerted themselves enough to alter the policy of their bloody government and the Fascists are beaten in Spain, they will have such a right."

There is less stress on the pure fakers, who invented not to advance their cause, but to grab headlines or column space. One correspondent in Italy, when the Allied advance reached San Marino, reported that tiny San Marino had forthwith declared war on Germany. It made such a good story that several days later the San Marino government went along with the gag and did so. The censors, who might have known better, did nothing to stop the original story; after all, they were not concerned with accuracy, and the story gave no aid or comfort to the enemy.

Knightley, in urging correspondents to circumvent censorship, apparently has little knowledge of censorship in depth. For a period of nine months from October, 1942, I covered naval operations around the British Isles. For five months of that period, working for United Press but carrying orders signed by COMNAVEUR Adm. Harold R. Stark which assigned me as U.S. Navy pool correspondent at Scapa Flow, I sailed with British warships on a total of seven Murmansk convoys, in everything from destroyers to battleships. Counting every hand at Scapa, in the Admiralty, and in Admiral Stark's headquarters that got a crack at my copy, I was working through a total of six censorships.

I managed to get off a second-hand description of the Christmas 1942 action between a British cruiser force and the *Hipper* and *Luetzow* (I was at sea with the wrong task force;) a number of features ranging from winter weather on the Murmansk run to the loveable qualities of the ungainly British catapult amphibian, the Walrus; the differences between life aboard a U.S. and a British warship; and the plight of U.S. troops perched on a glacier at Akureyre above the Arctic Circle, the jumping-off point for Murmansk. But I wasn't exactly covering the war.

Early in March, returning from RA53, my final convoy operation aboard *King George V*, and about to be relieved by an AP man as the pool correspondent, I was summoned by the Home Fleet Commander-in-Chief, Adm. Sir John Tovey, who wanted to talk about Murmansk convoys in general. He invited me to use what he told me on a background basis.

<sup>5</sup>This one was invented by *The Times* of London, embellished and given wide circulation by the French, and gave the German government fits. My father, S. Beach Conger II, was at that time chief of the Associated Press bureau in Berlin (1912-1917) and was given *carte blanche* by the German General Staff to go anywhere he wanted to in Belgium and talk to anybody without supervision; the incident was "widely known" to the Belgians, but had always happened in the next town down the line or over the hill. Proving a negative was, is, and remains difficult if not impossible.



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## Books

Over the next few days, I wrote a series of five articles, summarizing just about everything I had experienced on the Murmansk runs, topped off with the conclusions I had drawn from Admiral Tovey's remarks: (a) The Murmansk convoys required 40 percent of the Home Fleet destroyer strength at a time when escort ships were desperately needed for the Battle of the Atlantic; (they were also needed for forthcoming offensive operations in the Mediterranean, but that didn't belong in a news story); (b) Murmansk, the only Arctic Russian port open all winter, could barely handle 12 to 18 ships a month; (c) with only a single-track railroad to haul the stuff away, it sat on the Murmansk dock vulnerable to destruction by any German bomber free to hedgehop the few miles from the Norwegian border; and (d) as for the summer, when Archangel was available, the convoy route was exposed to German daylight air attacks 24 hours a day. The message was that the Persian Gulf Route—which in the course of the war handled 77.3 percent of all Allied aid to the USSR—was a far better way of getting help to the Russians.

Sure, I was used, but it would have made a legitimate story and an excellent series. What I didn't know was that because of all the reasons outlined by Tovey, plus the mid-March arrival of *Scharnhorst* to reinforce *Tirpitz* and *Luetzow* in northern Norwegian waters, Churchill on March 30 sent a message to Stalin informing him that the Murmansk convoys were being suspended following RA53, which had left Murmansk homebound on March 1.

It was late April, and I was back in London before the kindly chief censor at Admiralty summoned me to receive the remains of my Murmansk run series. There was about enough left to make one good feature story, but none of Tovey's remarks. In consolation, the censor pointed at some brown squiggles in the margin, in addition to the half-dozen spoors of my usual censors.

"Those," he said with a sort of hushed solemnity, "are the personal comments of the Prime Minister, and the whole shooting match was translated into Russian and flown to Moscow."

A couple of months later I was home briefly with a U.S. Navy task force which had been based at Scapa Flow, and I would have been able to write whatever I wanted in the New York office. I wonder if Knightley would say I should have written that the convoys had been suspended (the Germans could have used their forces in northern Norway elsewhere had they been sure) or that I had in effect been "used" by Admiral Tovey and the PM against the Russians.

"The point about censorship," Knightley notes, "is that while it can prevent a correspondent from sending a story the military does not want published, it cannot force him to send a false or exaggerated one." He shows that some correspondents can be misled; others will go along; but he fails to show that—given a conscientious objective press—Truth becomes the first casualty. *Whole Truth* may be wounded, maimed, or captured at times. *Nothing But The Truth* will report sick from contact with official communiqués and briefings—the Bodyguard of Lies—plus the occasional faker. *Truth*, however, is the combat-wise NCO who will still be around when all the other casualties are gone.

Clinton B. Conger.

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